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Preface
This dissertation consists of three chapters. Each chapter is self-contained.
Chapter 1 is joint work with Moritz Drechsel-Grau.1 We evaluate the hy-
pothesis that rising inequality was a causal source of the US household debt
boom since 1980. The mechanism builds on the observation that households
care about their social status. To keep up with the ever richer Joneses, the
middle class substitutes status-enhancing houses for status-neutral consump-
tion. These houses are mortgage-financed, creating a debt boom across the
income distribution. Using a stylized model we show analytically that aggre-
gate debt increases as top incomes rise. In a quantitative general equilibrium
model we show that Keeping up with the Joneses and rising income inequality
generate 60% of the observed boom in mortgage debt and 50% of the house
price boom. We compare this channel to two competing mechanisms. The
Global Saving Glut hypothesis gives rise to a similar debt boom, but does
not generate a house prices boom. Loosening collateral constraints does not
generate booms in either debt or house prices.
Chapter 2 is joint work with Moritz Drechsel-Grau as well. This chapter
shows that the well-documented parallel surge in household debt and top
income inequality in the United States has an important geographical com-
ponent. First, we establish that rising incomes of the top 10% are tightly
linked to rising debt of the non-rich after controlling for non-rich income as
well as fixed state and year characteristics. Second, we show that this re-
lationship is entirely driven by mortgage debt. While state-level changes in
non-mortgage debt are not related to state-level top incomes, our estimates
suggest that a 10% increase in a state’s top incomes induces a persistent in-
crease in mortgage debt of the state’s non-rich households by up to 5% over
the following years. The tight relationship between state-level top incomes
and non-rich mortgage debt has important implications for our understand-
ing of the drivers of the US household debt boom. In particular, our findings
1University of Mannheim.
7
8 CONTENTS
are consistent with the theory that top income inequality drives non-rich
debt through growing demand for debt as non-rich households attempt to
keep up with the housing of the rich.
Chapter 3 is joint work with Frederick Zadow.2 Housing wealth effects—
the reaction of consumption to changes in house prices—were at the heart
of the Great Recession. Empirical and quantitative macroeconomic stud-
ies have found that housing wealth effects are stronger for more indebted
households. One important policy implication is that lowering debt limits
for borrowers will dampen the consumption slump in a house price bust.
Such conclusions might be premature. We build a simple life-cycle model
with housing with closed form solutions for housing wealth effects. We show
that the strength of housing wealth effects crucially depends on the under-
lying household characteristics which also determine the debt levels. In this
framework imposing one-size-fits-all debt limits does not necessarily mitigate
housing wealth effects. To be effective, policies have to be tailored to borrow-
ers’ characteristics. Aggregate housing wealth effects can be reduced in three
ways: (i) if old homeowners reduce their housing wealth; (ii) if the home own-
ership rate decreases; (iii) if agents have smaller houses. We provide a simple
empirical test of our model predictions. When explaining housing wealth ef-
fects, we find that the level of mortgages turns statistically insignificant once
relevant household characteristics (age and a proxy for housing preferences)
are added.
2University of Mannheim.
Chapter 1
Falling Behind:
Has Rising Inequality Fueled
the American Debt Boom?
Joint with Moritz Drechsel-Grau.
1.1 Introduction
Between 1980 and 2007, US household debt doubled relative to GDP. Mort-
gage debt was by far the most important driver of this household debt boom
(see Figure 1.1.1a). In lockstep with mortgages, top income inequality has
risen since 1980 and reached its peak in 2007 (see Figure 1.1.1b). While real
incomes have stagnated for the bottom half of the population, the incomes of
the top 10% have more than doubled over this time period (see Figure 1.1.2a).
In the public debate, it was argued that rising top income inequality fueled
the boom in household debt (e.g. Rajan, 2010; Stiglitz, 2009; Frank, 2013a),
which in turn played an important role in the Global Financial Crisis of 2007
and the ensuing Great Recession.1
In this paper, we formally assess the hypothesis that rising top income
inequality was a causal driver of the household debt boom. The underlying
mechanism builds on the idea that households care about their social status.
When top incomes rise and the rich upgrade their houses, the non-rich lose
some of their social status. The non-rich substitute status-enhancing housing
for status-neutral consumption to keep up with the richer Joneses. These
1See the survey by van Treeck (2014) on the hypothesis that inequality caused the
financial crisis.
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houses are mortgage-financed, causing a debt boom across the whole income
distribution.
The idea that people care about how their belongings compare to those
of their neighbors is certainly not new (among others Veblen, 1899; Due-
senberry, 1949). Recently, there has been a growing empirical literature
showing that social comparisons shape people’s decision-making (e.g. Kuhn,
Kooreman, Soetevent, and Kapteyn, 2011; Luttmer, 2005; Bursztyn, Ederer,
Ferman, and Yuchtman, 2014; De Giorgi, Frederiksen, and Pistaferri, 2019).
We quantify the contribution of this mechanism to the observed mortgage
and house price booms (Figure 1.1.3) between 1980 and 2007 and compare
it to two alternative mechanisms in the literature. First, the Global Saving
Glut hypothesis (e.g. Bernanke, 2005; Justiniano, Primiceri, and Tambalotti,
2014) according to which foreign capital inflow has driven down interest
rates and hence enabled households to take out more debt. Second, financial
liberalization (e.g. Favilukis, Ludvigson, and van Nieuwerburgh, 2017), which
may increase borrowing due to a loosening of collateral constraints.2
To that end, we build a heterogeneous agent general equilibrium model
with housing and non-durable consumption goods, elastic housing supply, a
collateral constraint, a state-of-the-art earnings process (Guvenen, Karahan,
Ozkan, and Song, 2019) and a social comparison motive that we discipline
using recent micro evidence on housing comparisons in the US (Bellet, 2019).
We compare two steady states that differ only in the exogenous degree of in-
come inequality. Based on evidence by Kopczuk, Saez, and Song (2010) and
Guvenen, Kaplan, Song, and Weidner (2018) we scale the permanent com-
ponent of income inequality to match the increase in cross-sectional income
dispersion between 1980 and 2007.
We find that this rise in income inequality generates quantitatively signif-
icant mortgage and house price booms in the presence of Keeping up with the
Joneses. Our model generates 60% of the observed increase in the mortgage-
to-income ratio and 50% of the observed increase in house prices between
1980 and 2007. Even in the absence of Keeping up with the Joneses rising
inequality drives houses prices through growing demand for housing at the
top of the income distribution. Complementarities between housing and non-
durable consumption increase the housing and mortgage demand of non-rich
households. These general equilibrium effects are roughly doubled by social
comparisons. Social comparisons directly raise the housing demand (and
thus, demand for mortgages) for non-rich as a response to choices of the rich
2The expectations channel (Adam, Kuang, and Marcet, 2012; Kaplan, Mitman, and
Violante, 2020) is another important channel, but it cannot be easily integrated into our
model.
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(b) Inequality and mortgages have grown
in lockstep since 1980.
Figure 1.1.1: The American household debt boom and rising income in-
equality. Sources: US Flow of Funds and Alvaredo et al. (2016). Details see
Appendix 1.A.
through the status externality.
In comparison, the Saving Glut generates a similarly strong debt boom
through lower interest rates. However, it does not generate a strong house
price increase. Both mechanisms together can explain 75% of the increase
in the mortgage-to-income ratio and 60% of the house prices boom. Decom-
posing this total effect, we can attribute between one third and two thirds
of the explained increase in debt and about 90% of the explained increase in
house prices to rising inequality and social comparisons. Financial innova-
tion, i.e., relaxed collateral constraints, raises neither debt nor house prices
significantly.
Extensive robustness checks show that our quantitative findings are ro-
bust to perturbations in the internally and externally calibrated parameters.
The generated effects stay quantitatively significant for deviations from the
calibrated strength of the comparison motive.
In addition to the quantitative results, we show in closed form how top
incomes can affect aggregate debt in a stylized version of the model without
idiosyncratic earnings risk. In this infinite horizon network model (extend-
ing the one-period models in Ballester, Calvó-Armengol, and Zenou, 2006;
Ghiglino and Goyal, 2010), we prove that an individual’s debt is increasing
in top incomes if the household cares about the rich (directly or indirectly).
Moreover, we prove that if comparisons are upward looking (i.e., everybody
cares about the rich directly or indirectly), aggregate debt is increasing in
top incomes.
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1962 to 2014 in the US. Data are taken
from Piketty, Saez, and Zucman (2018a).
Growth rates are relative to the base year
1980.
(a) Since 1980 real incomes have stag-
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Figure 1.1.2: Despite stagnating incomes, mortgage debt increased for the
bottom 50 %.
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Figure 1.1.3: Nominal: Case-Shiller
Home Price Index for the USA. Real:
Deflated by the Consumer Price In-
dex. Source: http://www.econ.
yale.edu/~shiller/data.htm
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penditures over time. Data from
Bertrand and Morse (2016, aggre-
gated from the Survey of Consumer
Expenditures) for the USA.
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Contributions to the literature
Our findings contribute to the literature on distributional macroeconomics
(e.g. Kaplan and Violante, 2014; Ahn, Kaplan, Moll, Winberry, and Wolf,
2017; Kaplan, Moll, and Violante, 2018), providing another reason why
“inequality matters for macro”. Rising income inequality has an effect on
macroeconomic outcomes like house prices and aggregate mortgage debt as
agents are linked not only through prices but also directly through social
externalities of their consumption decisions.
Our main contributions concern the growing literature on the macroeco-
nomics of the mortgage and house price booms. This literature builds on
a variety of mechanisms: looser collateral constraints (e.g. Favilukis et al.,
2017), lending limits (Justiniano, Primiceri, and Tambalotti, 2019), dynam-
ics in foreign capital flows (Justiniano et al., 2014) and changes in house
price expectations (Adam et al., 2012; Kaplan et al., 2020). Besides intro-
ducing a novel mechanism into this literature, we provide new insights and
confirm findings on two other mechanisms. First, consistent with Kiyotaki,
Michaelides, and Nikolov (2011) and others, we find that relaxation of collat-
eral constraints does not generate sizable effects on debt and house prices.3
Second, we confirm that foreign capital inflows can have sizable effects on
household debt. In our model, the Saving Glut generates effects similar to
those in Justiniano et al. (2014).
Kumhof, Rancière, and Winant (2015) formalize an alternative causal
mechanism that links inequality and the debt boom in a model without
housing. In their model, the debt boom is driven by the rich who derive utility
from financial wealth, driving down interest rates. We provide an alternative
causal mechanism that is consistent with micro-evidence and the fact that
almost all of the debt boom was driven by mortgages (see Figure 1.1.1a).
Livshits, MacGee, and Tertilt (2010) show that if cross-sectional inequality
is driven by greater uncertainty (as opposed to variation in the permanent
component) aggregate unsecured debt is decreasing. This quantitative result
is driven by the precautionary savings motive. We complement their finding
by showing that aggregate debt is increasing with higher permanent income
inequality in an economy with durable goods.
In addition, a growing literature analyzes the consumption response to
house price changes (Guren, McKay, Nakamura, and Steinsson, 2020; Gar-
riga and Hedlund, 2020; Berger, Guerrieri, Lorenzoni, and Vavra, 2018). It
finds that consumption reacts more when houses are bigger. Our model
implies that house values become an ever bigger share of lifetime income
3This is in contrast to Favilukis et al. (2017) who generate sizable effects in their model
with a large fraction of agents close to the collateral constraint.
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when top incomes rise. Thus, rising top income inequality is amplifying the
consumption response in financial crises.
A large empirical literature has established that social comparisons mat-
ter for well-being (e.g. Luttmer, 2005; Card, Mas, Moretti, and Saez, 2012;
Perez-Truglia, 2019) and economic choices (Charles, Hurst, and Roussanov,
2009; Kuhn et al., 2011; Bursztyn et al., 2014; Bertrand and Morse, 2016;
Bursztyn, Ferman, Fiorin, Kanz, and Rao, 2017; Bellet, 2019; De Giorgi et al.,
2019). While the macroeconomic effects of keeping up with the Joneses have
already been studied in the context of representative agent models (e.g. Abel,
1990; Campbell and Cochrane, 1999; Ljungqvist and Uhlig, 2000), we are the
first to introduce social comparisons into a quantitative heterogeneous agents
model.
We build on the macroeconomic literature on keeping up with the Joneses
and bring it closer to the empirical evidence. First, we distinguish between
conspicuous and non-conspicuous goods. In our model households compare
themselves only in their houses, arguable the most important conspicuous
good (e.g. Solnick and Hemenway, 2005; Bertrand and Morse, 2016). And
second, agents compare themselves to the rich (e.g. Card et al., 2012; Bellet,
2019). Households only lose satisfaction with their own house, when a big
house is built.
Our analytical results extend those by Ghiglino and Goyal (2010) and
Ballester et al. (2006) who show that agents’ choices depend on the strengths
of social links in a one-period model. We extend their network models to infi-
nite horizon and add a durable good (housing) to show that debt is increasing
in the centrality of an agent. The centrality is reinterpreted as the weighted
sum of incomes of the comparison group.
Structure of the paper The rest of the paper is structured as follows:
In Section 1.2 we describe the model. In Section 1.3 we derive analytically
how top incomes drive debt in a stylized version of the model. In Section 1.4
we describe the parameterization of the full model, followed by quantitative
results in Section 1.5.
1.2 Model
We add social comparisons into an otherwise standard macroeconomic model
of housing. Our model is a dynamic, incomplete markets general equilibrium
model similar to the “canonical macroeconomic model with housing” in Pi-
azzesi and Schneider (2016). We formulate our model in continuous time to
take advantage of the fast solution methods of Achdou, Han, Lasry, Lions,
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and Moll (2017, in particular Section 4.3). We build our model with two aims
in mind. First, we want to illustrate how rising top-incomes and social com-
parisons can lead to rising debt levels across the whole income distribution.
And second, we want to quantify the effect of this channel on the increase in
aggregate mortgage debt and house prices from 1980 to 2007.
1.2.1 Setup
Time is continuous and runs forever. There is a continuum of households that
differ in their realizations of the earnings process. Households are indexed by
their current portfolio holdings (at, ht), where at denotes financial wealth and
ht denotes the housing stock, and their pre-tax earnings yt. They supply labor
inelastically to the non-durable consumption good and housing construction
sectors. The financial intermediary collects households’ savings and extends
mortgages subject to a collateral constraint. The state of the economy is the
joint distribution µt(a, h, y). There is no aggregate uncertainty.
1.2.2 Households
Households die at an exogenous mortality rate m > 0. The wealth of the
deceased is redistributed to surviving individuals in proportion to their asset
holdings (perfect annuity markets). Dead households are replaced by new-
born households with zero initial wealth and earnings drawn from its ergodic
distribution.4 Households derive utility from a non-durable consumption
good c and housing status s. They supply labor inelastically and receive
earnings y. After-tax disposible earnings are given by
y˜t = yt − T (yt),
where T is the tax function. Households choose streams of consumption ct >
0, housing ht > 0 and assets at ∈ R to maximize their expected discounted
lifetime utility
E0
∫ ∞
0
e−(ρ+m)t
(
(1− ξ)cεt + ξs(ht, h¯t)ε
) 1−γ
ε
1− γ ,
where ρ ≥ 0 is the discount rate and the expectation is taken over realizations
of idiosyncratic earnings shocks. 1/γ > 0 is the inter-temporal elasticity of
substitution, 1/(1 − ε) > 0 is the intra-temporal elasticity of substitution
4This follows Kaplan et al. (2018).
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between consumption and housing status and ξ ∈ (0, 1) is the relative utility-
weight for housing status.
A household’s utility from housing is a function of the housing status
s(h, h¯). Housing status increases in the household’s housing stock h and
decreases in reference housing h¯ which is a function of the equilibrium dis-
tribution of housing as introduced in the next section.
Housing is both a consumption good and an asset. It is modeled as a
homogenous, divisible good. As such, h represents a one-dimensional mea-
sure of housing quality (including size, location and amenities). An agent’s
housing stock depreciates at rate δ and can be adjusted frictionlessly.5 Home
improvements and maintenance expenditures xt have the same price as hous-
ing (p) and go into the value of the housing stock one for one.
Households can save (a > 0) and borrow (a < 0) at the equilibrium inter-
est rate r. Borrowers must post their house as collateral to satisfy an exoge-
nous collateral constraint. The collateral constraint pins down the maximum
possible loan-to-value ratio ω.
Households’ assets evolve according to
a˙t = y˜t + rtat − ct − ptxt,
h˙t = −δht + xt,
subject to the constraints
at ≥ −ωptht, (1.1)
ht > 0.
1.2.3 Social comparisons
We build on the macroeconomic literature (e.g. Abel, 1990; Gali, 1994; Camp-
bell and Cochrane, 1999; Ljungqvist and Uhlig, 2000) on keeping up with the
Joneses and bring it closer to the empirical evidence. These papers feature
representative agent models with one good and one asset. Agents compare
themselves in the single consumption good, and their reference measure is
the average consumption in the economy.6
We depart from this literature in two ways. First, we assume that house-
holds compare themselves only in their houses. This captures that people
compare themselves only in conspicuous goods and that housing is one of the
5Frictionless adjustment is justified, because we will be comparing long-run changes
(over a period of 27 years).
6In equilibrium the reference measure has to be equal to the optimal choice of the
representative agent.
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most important conspicuous goods—both in terms of visibility and expendi-
ture share (e.g. Solnick and Hemenway, 2005; Bertrand and Morse, 2016).
Second, we allow the reference measure to be a function of the distribution
of houses (and not necessarily its mean): h¯i = h¯i(µh). This reflects that the
comparison motive is asymmetric, being strongest (and best documented)
with respect to the rich (e.g. Clark and Senik, 2010; Ferrer-i-Carbonell, 2005;
Card et al., 2012, on self-reported well-being). People buy bigger cars when
their neighbors win in the lottery (Kuhn et al., 2011); non-rich move their
expenditures to visible goods (such as housing) when top incomes rise in their
state (Bertrand and Morse, 2016); and construction of very big houses leads
to substantially lower levels of self-reported housing satisfaction for other
residents in the same area—while the construction of small houses does not
(Bellet, 2019).
For our analytical results we assume that h¯ is a weighted mean of the
housing distribution and use s(h, h¯) = h− φh¯ for tractability. For the quan-
titative results, we set h¯ to the 90th percentile of the housing distribution
and use s(h, h¯) = h
h¯φ
based on empirical evidence (see Section 1.4).
1.2.4 Pre-tax earnings process
In our main experiment, we want to adjust life-time (permanent) income in-
equality independently of income risk to capture the way income inequality
has changed over time. We follow Guvenen et al. (2019), who estimate a pre-
tax earnings process on administrative earnings data. The process consists of
(i) individual fixed effects (αi), a persistent jump-drift process (zit), a tran-
sitory jump-drift process (εit), and heterogeneous non-employment shocks
(νit).7 We translate their estimated process to continuous time. Heterogene-
ity in αi represents fixed ex-ante differences in earnings ability which is an
important source of life-time inequality. The innovations of both the transi-
tory and persistent process are drawn from mixture distributions to match
higher order moments of income risk and impulse response functions. Finally,
Guvenen et al. (2019) show that a non-employment shock with z-dependent
shock probabilities greatly improves the model fit.8
7We use version (7), where we take out the deterministic life-cycle profile. The only
component that this version does not have are differences in deterministic income growth
rates.
8The only component that is missing compared to the Benchmark process is fixed
heterogeneous income profiles, i.e. ex-ante permanent heterogeneity in lifecycle income
growth rates.
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If employed, individual pre-tax earnings are given by
ypotit = exp(α˜
i + zit + εit).
We will refer to ypot as potential earnings. The actual pre-tax earnings (taking
into account unemployment) are
yit = (1− νit)ypotit ,
where
α˜i ∼ N (µα, σα),
it = −θzzit + Jzit,
εit = −θεzit + Jεit.
Jzit is a jump-process that arrives at rate λ
z. The size of the jump, ηzit is
drawn from a mixture of two normal distributions,
ηzit =
{
N (µz(1− pz), σz1) with prob. pz
N (− pzµz, σz2) with prob. 1− pz.
Similarly, the jump process for the transitory process arrives at rate λε and
the jump size, ηzit is drawn from a mixture of two normal distributions,
ηεit =
{
N (− εit + µε(1− pε), σε1) with prob. pε
N (− εit − pεµε, σε2) with prob. 1− pε.
The key difference between the persistent and the transitory process is that
the jumps in the former are added to the current state whearas the jumps in
the latter process reset the process such that the post-jump state is centered
around zero.
The nonemployment shock arrives at rate λν0(zit) and has average duration
1/λν1. Specifically, the arrival probability as a function of the current state
of the persistent process is modeled as
λν0(zit) =
exp
(
a+ bzit
)
1 + exp
(
a+ bzit
) .
1.2.5 Production
There are two competitive production sectors producing the non-durable
consumption good c and new housing investment Ih, respectively. Following
Kaplan et al. (2020), there is no productive capital in this economy.
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Non-Durable Consumption Sector The final consumption good is pro-
duced using a linear production function
Yc = Nc
where Nc are units of labor working in the consumption good sector. As total
labor supply is normalized to one, Nc is also the share of total labor working
in this sector. The equilibrium wage per unit of labor is pinned down at
w = 1.9
Construction Sector We model the housing sector following Kaplan et al.
(2020) and Favilukis et al. (2017). Developers produce housing investment
Ih from labor Nh = 1 − Nc and buildable land L¯, Ih = (ΘNh)α(L¯)1−α with
α ∈ (0, 1). Each period, the government issues new permits equivalent to L¯
units of land, and these are sold at a competitive market price to developers.
A developer solves
max
Nh
ptIh − wNh s.t. Ih = Nαh L¯1−α
In equilibrium, this yields the following expression for optimal housing in-
vestment
Ih = (αp)
α
1−α L¯
which implies a price elasticity of aggregate housing supply of α
1−α .
1.2.6 Financial markets
The financial intermediary collects savings from households and issues mort-
gages to households. Lending is limited by the households’ exogenous collat-
eral constraint (1.1).
In addition, the intermediary has an exogenous net asset position with
the rest of the world aSt . The equilibrium interest ensures that bank profits
are zero and the asset market clears,∫
at(a, h, y)µt = a
S
t . (1.2)
9Neither labor supply nor the wage appear in the earnings process, because there is no
aggregate risk, households inelastically supply one unit of labor, and the wage is equal to
1.
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1.2.7 Stationary Equilibrium
A stationary equilibrium is a joint distribution µ(a, h, y), policy functions
c(a, h, y, h¯), x(a, h, y, h¯), h(a, h, y, h¯), a(a, h, y, h¯), prices (p, r) and a reference
measure h¯ satisfying the following conditions
• Policy functions are consistent with agents’ optimal choices (ct, ht, at)t>0
given incomes (yt)t>0, prices p, r and the reference measure h¯.
• Housing investment is such that the construction sector maximizes
profits.
• µ(a, h, y) is stationary. That is, if the economy starts at µ, it will stay
there.
• Asset market clears (1.2) and housing investment equals housing pro-
duction
∫
x(a, h, y)dµ = Ih.
• The reference measure is consistent with choices: h¯ = h¯(µ).
1.3 Analytical Results
In this section we use a stylized version of the model described in section 1.2
to illustrate how rising top incomes can lead to rising mortgage levels across
the whole income distribution via social comparisons. In this section we show
analytically the following results.
In Proposition 1 we provide formulas for optimal housing and consump-
tion, as functions of their permanent incomes, and the permanent incomes
of the direct and indirect reference groups. In Proposition 2 we show that
optimal debt is increasing in the incomes of the direct and indirect reference
groups. In Proposition 3 we show that the impact of rising incomes y˜i on
aggregate debt is increasing in type i’s popularity. In Corollary 1 we show
that total debt-to-income is increasing in top incomes if at least one person
compares themselves to the rich. In Corollary 2 we show that under Cobb-
Douglas aggregation (ε = 0), these results hold even under housing market
clearing because they are independent of house prices p. In Corollary 3 we
show that these results crucially depend on the fact the status good h is
durable.
The assumptions needed to obtain tractability are that there is no id-
iosyncratic income risk; that the social status function is linear; and that the
interest rate equals the discount rate (all of these assumptions are relaxed in
the following sections).
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Assumption 1. r = ρ.
Further, we assume that there is a finite number of types of households i ∈
{1, . . . , N}. Agents vary by their initial endowments a0 and flow disposable
income y˜.
Assumption 2. Flow income y˜i is deterministic and constant over time, but
varies across types i.
Without loss of generality, we assume that types are ordered by their
permanent income Yi = rai0 + y˜i,
Y1 ≤ Y2 ≤ . . . ≤ YN .
We use bold variables to denote the vector variables for each type using the
above ordering, e.g. h = (h1, . . . , hN)T .
Assumption 3 (Tractable social comparisons). The status function s(h, h¯) =
h−φh¯ is linear and the reference measure h¯i =
∑
j 6=i gijhj is a weighted sum
of other agent’s housing stock (we assume gij ≥ 0).
Note, that we can write the vector of reference measures as h¯ = (h¯1, . . . , h¯N)T =
G · h := (gij)(hi). The matrix G can be interpreted as the adjacency matrix
of the network of types capturing the comparison links between agents of
each type. gij measures how strongly agent i cares about agent j.
We further require the comparisons to satisfy the following regularity
condition.
Assumption 4. The Leontief inverse (I − φG)−1 exists and is equal to∑∞
i=0 φ
iGi for φ from Assumption 3.
This assumption is not very strong. This assumption is satisfied whenever
the power of the matrix converges, Gi → G∞. For example, if G represents
a Markov chain with a stationary distribution or if G is nilpotent.
1.3.1 Characterizaton of the partial equilibrium
We solve for a simplified version of the equilibrium in Section 3.2.1. Agents
solve their optimization problem given prices and the reference measure; the
reference measure is consistent; but for now, we don’t require market clearing.
We use a lifetime budget constraint instead of the implicit transversality
condition.
Households optimal decisions are given in the following proposition.
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Proposition 1. Under assumptions 1, 2, 3 and 4 the optimal choices h =
(h1, . . . , hN)
T and a = (a1, . . . , aN)T are given by
h =
( ∞∑
i=0
(κ1φG)
i
)
κ2Y .
−ra = y˜ − κ3Y + (1− κ3)
( ∞∑
i=1
(κ1φG)
i
)
Y (1.3)
where κ1 = 1p(r+δ)
κ0
+1
∈ (0, 1), κ2 = κ1κ0 , κ3 = 11+ prδp+κ0 ∈ (0, 1) and κ0 =(
(r + δ)1−ξ
ξ
p
) 1
1−ε
.
Proof. See appendix 1.B.2.
Households’ choices depend on a weighted average of the permanent
incomes of their (direct and indirect) reference groups. The weights are
positive, whenever there is a direct or indirect social link between those
agents. This is captured by the income-weighted Bonacich centrality, B =∑∞
i=0(C1φG)
iY . If the weight Bij is positive, household j’s lifetime income
affects household i’s choices. This is the case whenever j is in i’s reference
group (there is a direct link gij > 0), or if j is in the reference group of some
agent k who is in the reference group of agent i (there is an indirect link of
length two, gikgkj > 0) or if there is any other indirect link (
∏N−1
n=1 g`n,`n+1
where `1 = i and `N−1 = j).
These results are reminiscent of those in Ballester et al. (2006). They
showed that the unique Nash equilibrium in a large class of network games
is proportional to the (standard) Bonacich centrality.
1.3.2 Comparative statics
First, we show that optimal debt and optimal housing are increasing in in-
comes of the direct and indirect comparison groups.
Proposition 2. For each type j in i’s reference group (that is, gij > 0) and
for each k that is in the reference group of the reference group (etc.) of i
(that is, there is j1, j2, . . . , jn such that gij1gj1j2 · · · gjn−1jngjnk > 0), then hi is
increasing and ai is decreasing in Yj (or Yk).
Proof. G is non-negative, so
∑
i c
iGi is non-negative for all c ≥ 0. From
the definition of the Leontief inverse, being the discounted sum of direct and
indirect links it follows,
∂hi
∂y˜j
> κ2κ1φgij > 0 and
∂hi
∂y˜k
> κ2(κ1φ)
n−1gij1gj1j2 · · · gjn−1jngjnk > 0.
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Similarly
−∂ai
∂y˜j
> (1−κ3)κ1φgij > 0 and −∂ai
∂y˜k
> (1−κ3)(κ1φ)n−1φgij1gj1j2 · · · gjn−1jngjnk > 0.
Agent A’s debt increases if agent B’s lifetime income increases—as long
as there is a direct or indirect link from A to B. That link exists, if agent
A cares about agent B, or if agent A cares about some agent C who cares
about agent B.
Second, we show how aggregage housing and debt react to changes in
type j’s income Yj. We first define the popularity of a type.
Definition 1 (Popularity). We define the vector of popularities as
bT = 1T
∞∑
i=1
(κ1φG)
i,
and type i’s popularity bi as the ith component of b.
The popularity is the sum of all paths that end at individual i. It measures
how many agents compare themselves with i (directly and indirectly) and
how strongly they do. The popularity of a type is crucial in determining how
strongly their income will affect economic aggregates.
Proposition 3. The impact of a change in type j’s on aggregate housing
and aggregate debt is proportional to its popularity.
∂
∂y˜j
∑
i
hi = κ2(1 + bj)
∂
∂y˜j
∑
i
rai = (1− κ3)(1 + bj).
Proof. Take the expressions from proposition 1 and plug in the definitions
for Y and b (Definition 1), aggregate housing can be written as ∑Ni=1 hi =
κ2
∑N
i=1(1+ bi)(y˜i+ ra
i
0) and aggregate debt can be written as −
∑N
i=1 rai =
(1 − κ3)
∑
y˜i − κ3
∑
ai0 + (1 − κ3)
∑N
i=1 bi(y˜i + ra
i
0). The derivatives follow
immediately.
Corollary 1. If all types i 6= j are connected to agent j and y˜j increases,
then debt-to-income increases for all types i 6= j.
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Proof. By Proposition 2 debt of types i 6= j increases, while their income is
unchanged. It follows that debt-to-income rises.
Corollary 2. Under Cobb-Douglas aggregation, the results for a in Proposi-
tions 1, 2 and 3 are independent of house prices.
Proof. Under Cobb-Douglas κ0 is divisible by p. This means that p cancels
in κ1 and κ3. Thus, all p cancel in the expression for a in Proposition 1 and
consequently doesn’t show up in the respective expressions in Propositions 2
and 3.
The results on optimal debt in Propositions 2 and 3 and Corollary 1 break
down if houses are not durable. When houses are non-durable, for any small
time interval ∆, the depreciation rate has to be δ = 1
∆
, so that the housing
stock depreciates immediately,
(1−∆δ)ht = 0.
To analyze this case in continuous time, we thus let the depreciation rate δ
go to infinity.
Corollary 3. When δ → ∞, optimal debt does not depend on others’ in-
comes.
Proof. It can be easily seen that κ3 → 1 as δ → ∞, thus (1 − κ3) → 0.
Since all other terms in expression (1.3) are bounded, the part containing
the Leontief inverse vanishes and becomes −ra = y˜ −Y = −ra0.
1.3.3 How rising top incomes fuel the mortgage boom:
Intuition
It is at the heart of the mechanism that there is a complementarity between
a household’s housing stock and their reference measure. When top incomes
YN rise, households of type N will improve (or upsize) their housing stock
hN , increasing the reference measure h¯i for all types i that care about type N
directly or indirectly. Each of these agents will optimally substitute durable,
status-enhancing housing for non-durable status neutral consumption.
For debt to be affected it is key that the status good is durable and the
status-neutral good in non-durable. Agents want their stock of the durable
good to be constant over time. They need to pay for the whole good ph
upfront and only replace the depreciation δph in the future. Agents need to
shift some of their lifetime income forward to finance their house. They use
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mortgages as an instrument to achieve that. The greater the value of the
house, the bigger is the necessary mortgage.
Corollary 3 formalizes this intuition. It shows that if houses are non-
durable (δ →∞), the term containing the Leontief inverse of the adjacency
matrix G vanishes.
1.3.4 Example: Upward comparisons with three types
of agents
We now illustrate the results for the simple case of three types of agents,
poor P , middle class M , and rich R. The poor type compares himself with
both other types, the middle type compares himself only with the rich type,
and the rich type not at all. Figure 1.3.1 shows the corresponding graph and
its adjacency matrix.
P M R
gPM
gPR
gMR
(a) The graph.
G =

P M R
P 0 gPM gPR
M 0 0 gMR
R 0 0 0

(b) The adjacency matrix.
Figure 1.3.1: The social network structure with three types, assuming upward
comparisons. The network can be represented as a graph and as its adjacency
matrix.
Since G is a triangular matrix with only zeros on the diagonal, it is
nilpotent (G3 = 0), and thus the Leontief inverse exists.
G2 =

P M R
P 0 0 gPMgMR
M 0 0 0
R 0 0 0
, G3 = 0
The matrix G2 counts the paths of length 2. In our example there is only
one such path—from type P to type R. Defining φ˜ = κ1φ, the vector of
Bonacich centralities is given by
∞∑
i=0
αiGi = I +
2∑
i=1
αiGi = I +
0 α · gPM α · gPR + α2 · gPM · gMR0 0 α · gMR
0 0 0

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The partial equilibrium choices for housing and debt are now given byhPhM
hR
 = κ2
1 φ˜ · gPM φ˜ · gPR + φ˜2 · gPM · gMR0 1 φ˜ · gMR
0 0 1
YPYM
YR

−r
aPaM
aR
 = y˜ − κ3Y + (1− κ3)
0 φ˜ · gPM φ˜ · gPR + φ˜2 · gPM · gMR0 0 φ˜ · gMR
0 0 0
YPYM
YR

An agent’s housing choice increases linearly in own permanent income, Y =
y˜ + ra0, and on the permanent income of agents in the reference group.
The poor agent’s consumption increases through the direct links, but also
indirect links (which are discounted more strongly). Agents’ decisions to
save or borrow depend on the ratio of initial wealth a0 and income y˜. The
higher the income relative to initial wealth, the greater the need to borrow.
1.4 Parameterization
Now we return to the full model. We parameterize the model to be consistent
with the aggregate relationships of mortgage debt, house value and income in
the US at the beginning of the 1980s. We use the estimated income process
from Guvenen et al. (2019) and assign eight other parameters externally.
The remaining two parameters (the discount rate ρ and the utility weight of
housing status ξ) are calibrated internally so that in general equilibrium the
aggregate net-worth-to-income ratio and aggregate loan-to-value ratio match
these aggregate moments in the 1983 Survey of Consumer Finances.
Income Process We translate the estimated income process from Guvenen
et al. (2019) to continuous time. It has a permanent, a persistent and a
transitory component and state-dependent unemployment risk. Guvenen
et al. (2019) estimate it to data from the time period 1994–2013. In order
to construct the income process for the baseline economy E (corresponding
to the year 1980) we rescale the permanent component following evidence on
the changes in the income distribution from Kopczuk et al. (2010), Guvenen,
Ozkan, and Song (2014) and Guvenen et al. (2018).
The cross-sectional dispersion of incomes has increased substantially be-
tween 1980 and 2007. Figure 1.4.1 (taken from Guvenen et al., 2018, Figure
12) shows the variation of three common measures over time: the P90/P50
ratio, the P90/P10 ratio and the standard deviation of log-earnings. These
changes in the variation of incomes can come from either component of the
income process, or even a combination of them.
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Figure 1.4.1: Change in the cross-sectional distribution of male earnings in
the US. Vertical bars in 1980, 2004 and 2007. Source: Guvenen et al. (2018)
While there is no consensus yet,10 as to which of those factors contributed
how much, there is evidence that rising permanent inequality explains a
substantial share in increased cross-sectional variation. Kopczuk et al. (2010,
Figure V) find that almost all of the change in earnings variation came from
increases in permanent inequality. This finding is supported by Guvenen
et al. (2014, Figure 5) who show that the variances of earnings shocks have
had a slight downward trend since 1980.
Given this evidence, we attribute all change in inequality to changes in
permanent inequality (σα). In our income process, permanent income in-
equality is represented by the permanent component α˜. So, given the dis-
cretized version of the process, we stretch the upper half of the α˜-grid to
match the changes in the cross-sectional P90/P50 ratio.
When translating the process to continuous time, we assume that shocks
arrive on average once a year (instead of every year). Moreover, we replace
the discrete time iid process by jump-drift process (εit) that is re-centered
around zero whenever a shock hits so that shocks do not accumulate. The
mean reversion rate of the persistent process (zit) is the negative log of the
discrete time persistence parameter which preserves the same annual auto-
correlation. The exit rate out of nonemployment is chosen to match the
average duration of nonemployment stays in the discrete time process. As
households in our infinite horizen model die at a constant rate, we remove all
age-dependence by setting the age profile constant (to the value at the mean
age t¯).11 Table 1.1 shows all parameters of our continuous time earnings
10Carr and Wiemers (2016, 2018) show that depending on data source, sample selection,
and statistical model one can find substantial differences in the decomposition into risk
and permanent inequality.
11This affects the mean of log earnings as well as the arrival rate of nonemployment
shocks.
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Table 1.1: Earnings Process Parameters
Parameter Value
Fixed Effects
µα mean 2.7408 + 0.4989t¯− 0.1137t¯2
σα standard deviation 0.467
Persistent Process
λz arrival rate 1.0
θz mean reversion rate − log(0.983)
pz mixture probability 0.267
µz location parameter -0.194
σz1 std. dev. of first Normal 0.444
σz2 std. dev. of second Normal 0.076
σz0 std. dev. of zi0 0.495
Transitory Shocks
λε arrival rate 1.0
θε mean reversion rate 0.0
pε mixture probability 0.092
µε location parameter 0.352
σε1 std. dev. of first Normal 0.294
σε2 std. dev. of second Normal 0.065
Nonemployment Shocks
a constant −3.2740− 0.8935t¯
b slope −4.5692− 2.9203t¯
λν1 exit rate 1/0.9784
process.
We put the process on a discrete state space, using the approach of
Kaplan et al. (2018). We discretize each component separately, obtaining
continuous-time Markov chains12 for the persistent and transitory compo-
nents and combining them afterwards. Finally, we add the state-dependent
non-employment risk.
Income Taxation We use the progressive income tax function from Heath-
cote, Storesletten, and Violante (2017),
T (y) = y − τ0y1−τ1 .
12Mostly called Poisson processes in the literature.
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Table 1.2: Baseline Parameters
Parameter description Source Value
Preferences
φ strength of keeping up motive Bellet (2017) 0.7
ρ discount rate internal 0.02
ξ utility weight of housing internal 0.277
1
1−ε intra-temporal elasticity of substitution Flavin and Nakagawa (2008, AER) 0.15
γ inverse intertemporal elasticity of substitution standard 1.5
1
m
constant mortality rate 45 years worklife 45.0
Housing and financial technogy
α
1−α price elasticity of housing supply Saiz (2010, QJE) 1.5
δ depreciation rate of housing Bureau of Economic Analysis 0.021
ω maximum loan-to-value ratio P95 of LTV 0.85
aS/y¯ exogenous net asst supply cum. current account -0.01
Taxation and Unemployment Insurance
τ0 level of taxes internal 0.932
τ1 progressivity Heathcote et al. (2017) 0.15
b replacement rate Dept of Labor 0.32
If non-employed, households receive a fraction b of their potential earnings
from unemployment insurance. Thus, the post-tax disposable income is given
by
y˜t =
{
ypotit − T (ypotit ) if employed
bypotit otherwise.
We follow Kaplan et al. (2020) in our choice of the parameters τ0, τ1. The
progressivity parameter τ1 is an estimate from Heathcote et al. (2017) and
the scale parameter τ0 is set to match the tax revenue from personal income
tax and social security contribution as a share of GDP in 1980 (14.4%).13 We
set the replacement rate to 32%, matching average unimployment insurance
benefits, as a fraction of average wage, as reported by the US Department of
Labor.14
Preferences and demographics The discount rate ρ and the utility
weight of housing status ξ are internally calibrated to match the economy-
wide mortgage-debt-to-income and loan-to-value ratios from the 1983 SCF.
The interpretation of the utility weight ξ differs from other models, because
ξ is the utility weight of housing status (not housing stock).
The literature has not yet converged to a common value for the intratem-
poral elasticity of substitution 1
1−ε . Estimates range from 0.13–0.24 (from
structural models; e.g. Flavin and Nakagawa, 2008; Bajari, Chan, Krueger,
13Retrieved from https://taxfoundation.org/federal-tax-revenue-source-1934-2018/.
14Retrieved from https://oui.doleta.gov/unemploy/DataDashboard.asp.
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and Miller, 2013) up to 1.25 (Ogaki and Reinhart, 1998; Piazzesi, Schnei-
der, and Tuzel, 2007, using estimates from aggregate data). Many papers
have picked parameters out of this range.15 We follow the evidence from
structurally estimated models and set the elasticity to 0.15.
The inverse intertemporal elasticity of substitution γ is set to the standard
value 1.5. The constant annual mortality rate m = 1/45 is set to get an
expected (working) lifetime of 45 years.
Social comparisons For the status function we use a ratio-specification
s(h, h¯) = h
h¯φ
as in Abel (1990). Bellet (2019) shows that this functional
form captures the empirical finding that the utility loss from a big houses
decreases with own house size. Households with a medium sized house are
more affected by top housing than households living in a small house.16
We define the reference measure as the 90th percentile of the (endogenous)
housing distribution, h¯ = hP90. This follows Bellet (2019) who shows that
households are only sensitive to changes in the top quintile of the house (size)
distribution and strongest when the reference measure is defined as the 90th
percentile.17
The parameter φ pins down the strength of the comparison motive. It is
the ratio of two utility elasticities
φ = −elasticity of utility w.r.t. h¯
elasticity of utility w.r.t. h
.
If the reference houses improves by 1%, then agents would have to improve
their own house φ% to keep utility constant. Bellet (2019) estimates φ to
be between 0.6 and 0.8 when setting h¯ equal to the 90th percentile of the
housing distribution. We thus choose φ = 0.7.18 Note that Bellet (2019)
estimates exactly this sensitivity allowing us to take his estimates without
an intermediate indirect inference procedure.
Technology and Financial Markets The construction technology pa-
rameter α is set to 0.6 so that the price elasticity of housing supply ( α
1−α)
equals 1.5, which is the median value across MSAs estimated by Saiz (2010).
15Garriga and Hedlund (2020) use 0.13, Garriga, Manuelli, and Peralta-Alva (2019) use
0.5, many papers use Cobb-Douglas (that is, an elasticity of 1.0, e.g. Berger et al., 2018;
Landvoigt, 2017) and Kaplan et al. (2020) use 1.25.
16Note that the more tractable linear specification (h − φh¯) as used in Campbell and
Cochrane (1999), Ljungqvist and Uhlig (2000) and Section 1.3 would imply the opposite
relationship between own house size and comparison strength.
17See Figure 6 in Bellet (2019).
18See Table 2 in Bellet (2019)
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Table 1.3: Targeted moments
moment model data (80/83)
aggregate loan-to-value 0.24 0.24
aggregate networth-to-income 4.63 4.6
tax-revenue-to-income 0.14 0.14
The maximum admissible loan-to-value ratio (ω) is set to 0.85, to match the
95th percentile of the LTV distribution in the SCF (Kaplan et al., 2020, use a
similar approach for setting the debt-service-to-income constraint). Finally,
we specfiy the exogenous net supply of assets aS to match the net foreign
debt position of the US. The net foreign debt position can be well approxi-
mated by the cumulative current account deficit of the US (Gourinchas, Rey,
and Govillot, 2017), which was 1% of GDP in 1980 (see also Figure 1.5.3).
1.4.1 Internal calibration and model fit
For the internal calibration we target the aggregate networth-to-income ratio
(4.6) and the aggregate loan-to-value ratio (0.24) from the first wave of the
Survey of Consumer Finances in 1983. We pick the utility weight of hous-
ing ξ and the the discount rate ρ so that simulated moments match their
counterparts in the data. Table 1.3 shows that the model fits the data very
well.
1.5 Quantitative Results
In this section we study how the model economy reacts to changes in the
environment in the long-run. We compare the initial stationary equilibrium
E (corresponding to 1980) with alternative stationary equilibria Ex where
we adjust income inequality I, capital inflow (Saving Glut) S and and the
collateral constraints ω to reflect the observed changes in the data.
In the first experiment we compare E to EI where only income inequality
rises. Afterwards we set these results into perspective, comparing them to
equilibria that reflect other (combinations) of mechanisms like ES (Saving
Glut), Eω (relaxation of borrowing limit) and EISω (all three mechanisms).
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Figure 1.5.1: Comparison simulated changes in aggregate variables between
the steady states in 1980 and 2007.
1.5.1 Rising inequality, mortgages and house prices
We now move to the main experiment of the paper. We start from the
steady-state calibrated to the U.S. economy in 1980. Then we raise income
inequality to match the level in 2007 and compare the mortgage debt, house
prices and housing production between 1980 and 2007. Before getting to the
results, we describe how we model the increase in income inequality.
Modelling rising inequality
As we have discussed in Section 1.4, the cross-sectional dispersion of income
has increased substantially between 1980 and 2007. Given the evidence in
Kopczuk et al. (2010) and Guvenen et al. (2014) we attribute the whole
change in cross-sectional inequality to changes in permanent inequality. In
our model permanent inequality is reflected by the standard deviation of the
distribution of the permanent component σα. Thus, we increase σα to match
the increase in the cross-sectional P90/P50 ratio.
Results
Rising inequality and keeping up with the Joneses creates both a mortgage
boom and a house price boom in our model. Figure 1.5.1 shows that our
mechanism generates an increase in the mortgage-to-income ratio of about
60%—about half of the increase that is observed in the data. Similarly, we
generate a house price boom (+38%) that generates 62% of the increase in
the data.
Keeping up with the Joneses are a quantitatively important to generate
the results. Figure 1.5.2 shows how much of the simulated debt and mortgage
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Figure 1.5.2: Comparison simulated changes in aggregate variables between
the steady states in 1980 and 2007. “w/o keeping up” shows the changes
when the reference measure h¯ is kept fixed at level h¯1980 from the initial
stationary equilibrium.
booms can be obtained with rising inequality, but without status concerns.19
Without keeping up with the Joneses, the debt boom would be 71% weaker
and the house price boom would be 44% weaker. The sizable effect of rising
income inequality comes from general equilibrium effects. Rising inequality
raises house prices and thus housing expenditures across the distribution.
Since houses are financed by mortages, demand for credit increases. The
interest rate rises to clear asset markets.
There are four channels at play. (i) Rising top incomes raise the demand
for housing and house prices because the richer households want to live in
bigger houses. (ii) Agents react to the new reference measure. They substi-
tute houses for consumption to keep up with the Joneses. (iii) All households
react to the higher house prices. Agents will spend a larger fraction of their
income on houses, because houses and consumption are not perfects substi-
tutes. (iv) The three channels above raise the demand for housing, and thus
the demand for mortgages. Interest rates rise until demand for savings (i.e.
credit supply) meets credit demand.
1.5.2 Horse race against alternative mechanisms
Rising inequality together with a “keeping up with the Joneses” motive is not
the only possible explanation for the rise in mortgages and house prices. The
19Instead of recalibrating the model with s(h, h¯) = h one can use that for a given
reference measure h¯ that is constant across the population, the initial equilibrium E is
equivalent to a parameterization with s(h, h¯) = h and housing weight ξ˜ such that ξ˜
1−ξ˜ =
ξ
1−ξ
1
h¯φ
. This holds because our specification of social comparisons, just reweights the
utility of housing and consumption.
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main complementary mechanisms are the Global Saving Glut (capital inflow
from emerging markets; Bernanke, 2005), financial innovation (securitization
allows banks to lend more liberally to less credit-worthy households; e.g.
Favilukis et al., 2017) and a bubble in the housing market (house prices rose
in expecation of rising house prices; e.g. Kaplan et al., 2020).
In this section compare the magnitudes of two competing channels (Sav-
ing Glut and relaxation of borrowing limits) with our main mechanism. An-
alyzing the role of expectations for the housing boom is beyond the scope of
our model.
Global Saving Glut
Just like the US mortgage boom, growing international imbalances have been
discussed as a source of instability leading to the Global Financial Crisis.
Bernanke (2005, then Fed govenor) was one of the first to interpret these
imbalances not in terms of trade imbalances, but as an accumulation of
external debt: The cumulative current account deficit is approximately equal
to the net foreign asset position. As seen in Figure 1.5.3 the cumulative
current account reached −40% of GDP in 2006. That is, the US was a net
debtor with net debt amounting to 40% of GDP20
Bernanke (2005) also provides a potential source for this rise in foreign
debt: the steep increase in the global demand for savings, especially from
20Gourinchas et al. (2017) estimate that the precise net foreign asset position was less
negative due to valuation effects.
1.5. QUANTITATIVE RESULTS 35
China and India. He argues that these savings flowed into the US economy,
building up the US debt position.
Through the lens of our model, the global saving glut changes the market
clearing condition (1.2) of the asset and mortgage market. Exogenous asset
supply is given by aSt , where a
S
t /y¯t is the cumulative current account from
Figure 1.5.3 (y¯t is average pre-tax earnings, our measure of GDP).
Comparing the Saving Glut to our main mechanism, Figure 1.5.5 shows that
the Saving Glut indeed causes a substantial increase in the mortgage-to-
income ratio (at the same order of magnitued as inequality and keeping up
with the Joneses) and only a very weak increase in house prices if inequality
is held fixed at the 1980 level.
Note that the way we model the Saving Glut potentially biases the effects
upwards. We assume that the capital inflow is purely driven by foreign de-
mand for assets. If, on the other hand, part of the capital inflow is driven by
increased supply of assets (from higher demand for mortgages), the part of
the external debt position might just be a symptom of a demand-side mecha-
nism like ours. Assuming a small open economy (constant interest rate), our
main mechanism generates a mortgage boom that is large enough to explain
the build-up of external debt. Kumhof, Ranciere, Richter, Throckmorton,
Winant, and Ozsögüt (2017) indeed find that rising top incomes are an im-
portant predictor of a current account deficits (and thus, foreign debt). In
this case, the Saving Glut (the increased demand for assets) would be less
powerful.
Financial liberalization and innovation
Another promiment explanation for debt boom is a relaxation of constraints
in the financial sector. These might come from regulatory changes or fi-
nancial innovation. In 2007, banks could give out more mortgages than in
1980 because law required lower collateral requirements on the banks’ and
the households’ balance sheets. Moreover, banks’ technology might have
improved, so that they are no able to lend on worse terms (e.g. higher loan-
to-value ratios). Favilukis et al. (2017) and Justiniano et al. (2019) have
shown that under certain condition the relaxation of constraints can have
sizable effects on total lending. We show, that in our model this is not the
case because interest rates rise in general equilibrium.
We model financial liberalization and financial innovation in a reduced
form way. We assume that the exogenous LTV limit (ωt) increases over
time. As a proxy for this borrowing limit, we use the 95th percentile of the
LTV distribution in the Surveys of Consumer Finances, which is shown in
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Figure 1.5.5: Compare simulated changes in aggregate variables for different
scenarios. Saving Glut: Constant inequality and reference measure h¯, varying
aS to match net foreign debt position (see Figure 1.5.3). relaxation: Constant
inequality and reference measure h¯, varying ω to match P95 of the LTV
distribution (see Figure 1.5.4)
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Figure 1.5.6: Decomposition of the three mechanisms
Figure 1.5.4. In line with the data we assume that the LTV limit increases
from 0.85 in 1980 to ω2007 = 0.96.
Figure 1.5.5 shows that in general equilibrium, this mechanism doesn’t
contribute to the debt and house price booms. These results differ from
Favilukis et al. (2017) because there are not many constrained agents in our
equilibrium. Their equilibrium is constructed in a way that a big part of the
population is at or close to the constraint. Moreover, they use an exogenous
inflow of capital to keep the interest rate down.
Decomposition of the three mechanisms
Instead of looking at the channels individually, we will now analyze their
marginal effects. We add three mechanisms to the baseline economy one
by one and compute their marginal effects. In a first step we compare the
1.6. CONCLUSION 37
baseline economy E with the Saving Glut economy ES. Then we compute the
marginal effect of adding rising inequality and keeping up with the Joneses in
EIS and finally we compute the marginal effect of a relaxation of the collateral
constraint in EISω.
All three mechanisms together generate an increase in the mortgage-to-
income ratio of 83% and an increase in house prices of 38%. In Figure 1.5.6
and Table 1.D.2 we provide a decomposition. The contributions of each chan-
nel depends on the ordering in which they are added. Rising inequality and
social comparison contributes between 39% and 72% to the total generated
increase in mortgage-to-income and more than 95% of the total generated
house price boom. The Saving Glut contributes 21–55% to the debt boom
and has only negligible effects on house prices. Relaxation of the collateral
constraint has only a minor contribution to both.
Thus, rising inequality and keeping up with the Joneses are an important
amplifier of the Saving Glut when it comes to mortgage debt. Moreover,
among the three mechanisms, rising inequality and and keeping up with the
Joneses is the only channel that generates a substantial increase in house
prices.
Mortgages and houses across the income distribution
The mechanisms have different predictions on how housing and mortgage
holdings change across the income distribution. Figure 1.5.7 shows the per-
centage change of house value (ph) and mortgage holdings as a fraction of
income across the income distribution. In the data, there is in inverse-U
shape in housing growth. The middle income quintiles had the strongest
growth in house-value-to-income. Rising inequality and keeping up with the
Joneses generates a very similar pattern, where the second and the third
quintiles react strongest. The Saving Glut predicts only negligible effects on
housing across the income distribution, and it does counterfactually predict
that the effect is increasing over the income distribution.
1.6 Conclusion
Rising inequality and keeping up with the Joneses were an important driver of
mortgage debt and house prices in the decades prior to the Great Recession.
In our calibrated heterogenous agent macroeconomic model, rising inequality
and keeping up with the Joneses generate an increase in the mortage-to-
income ratio of around 60%, about half as much as observed in the data
between 1980 and 2007.
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Figure 1.5.7: Compare simulated changes in housing and mortgages across
the income distribution to the data (from the Survey of Consumer Finances).
Is also an important amplifier of alternative mechanisms that generate a
debt boom. In a model with exogenous capital inflow (to capture the Global
Saving Glut) and relaxing borrowing constraints (to capture financial liber-
alization) adding Keeping up with the Joneses and rising inequality boosts
the debt boom by a factor of two (generating 83% instead of 38%). Among
these three mechanisms, rising inequality and keeping up with the Joneses is
the only mechanism that generates a sizable house price boom (generating
62% of that observed in the data).
Both of these results are robust to perturbations of the parameters.
We show analytically that under social comparisons households’ optimal debt
level is increasing in incomes of the direct and indirect reference group. When
everybody is directly or indirectly connected to the rich, aggregate debt rises
in response to rising top incomes. Our tractable framework exposes how this
mechanism works. Households substitute durable houses for non-durable
consumption when top incomes rise because houses are a status good. Since
houses are durable, they are optimally debt-finance. So an increase in the
housing share also increase debt levels.
Avenues for future research With our mechanisms, rising inequality can
be an important amplifier of financial crises. First, it amplifies the aggregate
consumption response to house price shocks, because these housing wealth
effects are increasing in the house share (Berger et al., 2018; Chapter 3).
Second, trends in top income inequality can lead to expectations of future
house price growth, and thus serve as a trigger for the expectations channel
of the housing boom and bust (Kaplan et al., 2020).
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The insights from this paper can also lead to interesting research in inter-
national finance. It provides a different angle on the growing current account
imbalances of the US. Rising demand for credit can attract foreign capital
leading to a current account deficit.
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Appendix
1.A Data sources
Figure 1.1.1: Aggregate debt and inequality We data on outstanding
household debt from the US Flow of Funds, retrieved from FRED: total
debt (TLBSHNO) and mortgages (HMLBSHNO). Other debt is constructed as the
difference between total debt and mortgages. Debt is displayed as a share of
nominal GDP (Bureau of Economic Analysis, BEA, via FRED: GDP).
The top 10% income share is from theWorldWealth and Income Database
(Alvaredo et al., 2016).
Figure 1.1.2b We use the micro data from the Survey of Consumer Fi-
nances (SCF). The SCF uses multiple imputation to overcome problems of
missing data. We join all five imputations and treat them as one data set.
This is valid because we do not do inference.
1.A.1 Horse race
Figure 1.5.3: Net foreign debt position of the US We use the current
account and GDP series from the BEA, retrieved via FRED (BOPBCA, GDP).
Following Gourinchas et al. (2017) we compute the cumulative sum of the
current account
cum CAt =
t∑
i=1960
CAt
and show it as a fraction of GDP in that given year cum CAtGDPt .
Figure 1.5.4: P95 of LTV distribution (proxy for ω) We use the
micro data from the Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF). We join all five
imputations and treat them as one data set. This is fine since we don’t do
inference. We use the definition of mortgages and house value from above.
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We calculate individual LTVi,t =
outstanding mortgagesi,t
housei,t
. For each year we report
the 95% percentile of the LTV distribution.
1.B Proofs
1.B.1 Lemmas
Lemma 1. The necessary conditions for an optimum of the households’
problem are
uc
(
ct, s(ht, h¯t)
)
= λt (1.4)
us
(
ct, s(ht, h¯t)
)
sh(ht, h¯t) = λt(r + δ)p (1.5)
λ˙t − ρλt = −rλt (1.6)
where λ is the co-state in the continuous time optimization problem.
Proof. Without adjustment costs, the two endogenous state variables at and
ht collapse into one state variable net worth wt.
w˙t = rwt + yt − (r + δ)pht − ct
The present-value Hamiltonian is
H(w, h, c, λ) = u
(
c, s(h, h¯)
)
+ λ
(
rwt + yt − (r + δ)pht − ct
)
,
where w is the state, c and h are the controls and λ is the co-state. The
necessary conditions are
∂H(wt, ht, ct, λt)
∂c
= uc
(
ct, s(ht, h¯t)
)− λt = 0
∂H(wt, ht, ct, λt)
∂h
= us
(
ct, s(ht, h¯t)
)
sh(ht, h¯t)− λt(r + δ)p = 0
λ˙t − ρλt = ∂H(wt, ht, ct, λt)
∂w
= −rλt.
Lemma 2. Under our assumption of CRRA-CES preferences, the optimal
relation of ct and ht is given by
ξ
1− ξ
(s(ht, h¯t)
ct
)ε−1
sh(ht, h¯t) = (r + δ)p. (1.7)
Further assuming Assumption 3 yields
ct = κ0ht − κ0φh¯t, where κ0 =
(
(r + δ)p
1− ξ
ξ
) 1
1−ε
. (1.8)
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Proof. Combining conditions (1.4) and (1.5) yields
us(ct, st)
uc(ct, st)
sh(ht, h¯t)
!
= (r + δ)p.
For the given CRRA-CES preferences the marginal utilites are given by
uc(ct, st) = ((1− ξ)cεt + ξsεt)
1−γ
ε
−1(1− ξ)cε−1t
us(ct, st) = ((1− ξ)cεt + ξsεt)
1−γ
ε
−1ξsε−1t . (1.9)
Thus,
us(ct, st)
uc(ct, st)
=
ξ
1− ξ
(st
ct
)ε−1
.
Plugging in above yields the first statement. Using Assumption 3 we get
ξ
1− ξ
(ht − φh¯
ct
)ε−1
= (r + δ)p.( ct
ht − φh¯
)
=
(
(r + δ)p
1− ξ
ξ
) 1
1−ε
= κ0
ct = κ0ht − κ0φh¯t
Lemma 3. Under the assumption of time-constant house prices p, and all
previous assumptions of this section, individual choices ct, ht are constant
over time.
Proof. The costate λ is constant over time. This follows from using Assump-
tion 1 in condition (1.6), which gives λ˙t = 0.
Plugging in (3.9) in condition (1.5) one gets that an decreasing function
of h is constant over time, thus ht is constant over time. Knowing that ht
constant over time, and a similar argument for condition (1.4) it follows that
ct is constant over time.
1.B.2 Proof of Proposition 1
From the lemmas above we get that
c = κ0s(h, h¯) = κ0h− κ0φh¯.
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Using the lifetime budget constraint we get
Y := ra0 + y = ph(r + δ) + c
= h
(
p(r + δ) + κ0
)
−κ0φh¯
=⇒ h = Y + κ0φh¯
p(r + δ) + κ0
=
1
p(r + δ) + κ0︸ ︷︷ ︸
κ2
Y + κ0
p(r + δ) + κ0︸ ︷︷ ︸
κ1
φh¯ = κ2Y + κ1φh¯
(1.10)
where
κ1 :=
κ0
p(r + δ) + κ0
=
1
p(r+δ)
κ0
+ 1
∈ (0, 1)
since
p(r + δ)
κ0
=
( 1
(r + δ)p
) 1
1−ε−1( ξ
1− ξ
) 1
1−ε
> 0.
Stacking equations (1.10) for and using h¯ = Gh
h = κ2Y + κ1φGh
h = (I − κ1φG)−1κ2Y =
( ∞∑
i=0
(κ1φG)
i
)
κ2Y .
Moreover,
h¯ = Gh =
κ1φ
κ1φ
G
( ∞∑
i=0
(κ1φG)
i
)
κ2Y
=
1
κ1φ
( ∞∑
i=1
(κ1φG)
i
)
κ2Y
=
1
κ0φ
( ∞∑
i=1
(κ1φG)
i
)
Y
(I − κ1φG)−1 is a Leontief inverse. It exists if the matrix power series∑∞
i=0(κ1φG)
i converges21. In that case
(I − κ1φG)−1 =
∞∑
i=0
(κ1φG)
i.
21This is the case for all nilpotent matrices (there exists a power p such that Gp = 0I)
(there are no infintely-long paths in the network) or if all eigenvalues of κ1φG are between
0 and 1. This holds whenever G can be interpreted as a Markov Chain.
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Now, we calculate debt.
−ra = y − δph− c
using 1.B.2,
= y − δph− κ0h+ κ0φh¯
= y − (δp+ κ0)h+ κ0φh¯
−ra = y − (δp+ κ0)
( ∞∑
i=0
(κ1φG)
i
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
=I+
(∑∞
i=1(κ1φG)
i
)
κ2Y +
( ∞∑
i=1
(κ1φG)
i
)
Y
= y − κ3Y + (1− κ3)
( ∞∑
i=1
(κ1φG)
i
)
Y
where
κ3 = (δp+ κ0)κ2 =
δp+ κ0
p(r + δ) + κ0
=
1
1 + pr
δp+κ0
∈ (0, 1).
1.C Numerical solution for a stationary equi-
librium
We first describe how we discretize the complex income process, then we
show how to solve the partial equilbrium using a finite difference method
from Achdou et al. (2017). Finally we present the algorithm used to compute
equilibrium prices and reference measure.
The model was solved using version 1.2 of the Julia language. For a given
parameterizaton, 200 endogenous grid points and 2000 exogenous gridpoints
solving for a general equilbrium takes about 30 minutes on standard laptop
using just one core.
For the calibration we ran the code in parallel (using 30 nodes with 16
cores) for 12 hours on a high performance cluster.
1.C.1 Discretizing the income process
Pre-tax earnings depend on four exogenous states θ = (α˜, z, ε, ν),
y(θ) = (1− ν) exp(α˜ + z + ε).
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We first discretize the two jump-drift processes z and ε following the pro-
cedure of Kaplan et al. (2018). We discretize them separately, creating two
continuous time Markov chains and combining them. The statespace of the
combined continous time Markov Chain is given by
{z1, . . . , zNz} × {ε1 . . . εNε}.
Then we add non-employment states for each state, where the transition
probabilities into the non-employment state are state-dependent. The states-
pace of the CTMC with non-employment becomes
{z1, . . . , zNz} × {ε1 . . . εNε} × {0, 1}.
Finally we add the discretize the permanent component α˜. We choose
Nα = 10 gridpoints, where each of those gridpoints represents a decile of
α˜’s distribution. Conditional on drawing α˜i, the other three components fol-
low the same CTMC with Nz ·Nε · 2 states. Denote the changing states by
θ˜ = (z, ε, ν)
The transition between states θ˜ is given by the intensities qij. For an
agent at state θ˜i the probability of jumping to a new state θ˜j within the
time short time period ∆ is approximately given by pij(∆) ≈ qij∆. More
precisely, given the intensity matrix Q = (qij) where qij ≥ 0 for i 6= j and
qii = −
∑
k 6=i qik, the matrix of transition probabilities is given by
P (∆) = exp(−∆Q),
where exp is the matrix exponential. P (∆) is a stochastic matrix.
1.C.2 Partial equilbrium given p, r, h¯
Given prices (p, r) and reference measure h¯ the households’ problem can
be characterized by a coupled system of partial differential equations: the
Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equation and the Kolmogorov forward (KF)
equation. The HJB equation describes the optimization problem of the
households and the KF equation describes the evolution of the cross-sectional
distribution µ(a, h, y).
We solve these two equations using the finite difference method from
Achdou et al. (2017). The discretized system can be written as
ρv = u(v) + A(v; r, p, h¯)v
0 =
(
A(v; r, p, h¯) +M
)T
g,
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where v is the discretized value function, g is the discretized cross-sectional
distribution, u(v) is the discretized flow utility, A(v; r, p, h¯) is the discretized
infinitesimal generator of the HJB equation (a very sparse matrix) and M is
a matrix that corrects the intensities for births and deaths. The discretized
system reveals how tightly coupled the HJB and KF equations are. The
matrix A(v; r, p, h¯) shows up in both equation. Once it is known from the
solution of the HJB equation, it can be directly used to get the distribution
g from the KF equation.
Solving the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation
We assume that housing h can be adjusted frictionlessly. So the two states
h and a collapse into one, “net worth”
wt = at + pht,
with its law of motion
w˙t = rwt + yt − (r + δ)pht − ct.
The collateral constraint can be rewritten in terms of w
wt = pht + at ≥ pht − ωpht
=⇒ pht ≤ wt
1− ω .
The households’ HJB equation is
(ρ+m)v(w, θi) = max
c,h≤ w
1−ω
u(c, s(h, h¯))
+ vw(w, θi)(rw + θi − (r + δ)ph− c)
+
∑
k 6=i
qik(v(w, θk)− v(w, θi)).
The intensities qij are the intensities of the continuous time Markov chain
from Section 1.C.1. In order to solve this equation, we need to replace the
maximum operator with the maximized Hamiltonian. That is, we need to
plug in the optimal policy functions c∗(w, y), h∗(w, y) which are given in
Corollary 4 below. The result depends on the following lemma.
Lemma 4. When the collateral constraint is slack, we get the optimality
conditions
h(w, y) =
(
1
τ2
(
h¯φ(ρ+ δ)pvw(w, y)
))− 1γ
h¯φ
c(w, y) = s(h(w, y), h¯)τ1,
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where τ1 =
(
(r + δ)p1−ξ
ξ
h¯φ
) 1
1−ε
and τ2 = ((1− ξ)τ ε1 + ξ)
1−γ−ε
ε ξ.
Proof. Using the optimality conditions (1.7) and (1.5) with (1.9) we get
(r + δ)p =
us(c, s)
uc(c, s)
sh(h, h¯) =
ξ
1− ξ
(s(h, h¯)
c
)ε−1
sh(h, h¯) (1.22)
(ρ+ δ)pvw(w, y) = us
(
c, s
)
sh = ((1− ξ)cε + ξsε)
1−γ
ε
−1ξsε−1sh. (1.23)
Using (1.22) we express optimal c as a function of optimal s
c(h, h¯) = s(h, h¯)
(
(r + δ)p
1− ξ
ξ
1
sh(h, h¯)
) 1
1−ε
using the ratio specification for s
= s(h, h¯)
(
(r + δ)p
1− ξ
ξ
h¯φ
) 1
1−ε
=: s(h, h¯)τ1.
Then we can plug this expression into (1.23) and get
(ρ+ δ)pvw(w, y) = ((1− ξ)(τ1s)ε + ξsε)
1−γ−ε
ε ξsε−1sh
= ((1− ξ)τ ε1 + ξ)
1−γ−ε
ε ξ︸ ︷︷ ︸
=:τ2
s1−γ−εsε−1sh
= τ2s
−γsh
Thus we get
s(h, h¯) =
(
(ρ+ δ)pvw(w, y)
τ2sh
)− 1
γ
,
and using ratio-specification for s,
h =
(
1
τ2
(
(ρ+ δ)pvw(w, y)h¯
φ
))− 1γ
h¯φ.
Corollary 4. The optimal policies are given by
h∗(w, y) =
{
h(w, y) if h(w, y) < w
p(1−ω)
w
p(1−ω) otherwise
, c∗(w, y) =
{
c(w, y) if h(w, y) < w
p(1−ω)
c˜(w, y) otherwise
where h(w, y) and c(w, y) are from Lemma 4 and c˜(w, y) is the solution to
the optimality condtion for c, given h = w
p(1−ω) ,
vw(w, y) = ((1− ξ)cε + ξsε)
1−γ−ε
ε (1− ξ)cε−1,
which is solved numerically.
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Given the optimal policies, it is straight-forward to solve the HJB using
the implicit upwind scheme in Achdou et al. (2017).
Solving the Kolmogorov forward equation
We construct the birth and death matrix M as in Kaplan et al. (2018) and
solve for the distribution using the implicit scheme from Achdou et al. (2017).
1.C.3 General equilibrium: Solving for r, p and h¯
We use the following algorithm to compute general equilibria.
0. Guess r0, p0 and h¯0
1. Clear housing markets given rn−1 and h¯n−1
(a) Use Newton steps until the sign of the excess demand for housing
changes
(b) Use Bisection to find the market clearing price pn
2. Compute the excess demand on the asset market
3. Use a Newton step to update the interest rate rn
4. Compute the implied reference measure h¯x and update h¯n = h¯n−1 +
a(h¯x − h¯n−1)
5. If rn ≈ rn−1 and h¯n ≈ h¯n−1, an equilibrium has been found. If not, go
back to step 1.
1.D Additional tables
In this appendix we show the tables corresponding to the figures in the main
text.
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Table 1.D.1: Disentengling the effects of rising inequality and keeping up
with the Joneses
mortgage-to-income house prices
growth share % of data growth share % of data
Rising inequality 0.17 0.29 0.15 0.22 0.56 0.35
& Keeping up +0.43 0.71 0.38 +0.17 0.44 0.27
total 0.60 1.0 0.53 0.38 1.0 0.62
Table 1.D.2: Decomposition of the constributions of the three channels on
the mortgage and house price booms.
(a) Starting from Keeping up with the Joneses
mortgage-to-income house prices
growth share % of data growth share % of data
Inequality and keeping up 0.60 0.72 0.53 0.38 1.0 0.62
& Saving Glut +0.17 0.21 0.15 +0.00 0.0 0.0
& Relaxed collateral constraint +0.06 0.07 0.05 +0.00 0.0 0.0
total 0.83 1.0 0.74 0.38 1.0 0.63
(b) Starting from the Saving Glut
mortgage-to-income house prices
growth share % of data growth share % of data
Saving Glut 0.32 0.39 0.28 0.02 0.04 0.03
& Inequality and keeping up +0.45 0.55 0.4 +0.37 0.95 0.6
& Relaxed collateral constraint +0.06 0.07 0.05 +0.00 0.0 0.0
total 0.83 1.0 0.74 0.38 1.0 0.63
Table 1.D.3: The effects of each channels on mortgages and house prices
mortgage-to-income house prices
growth % of data growth % of data
Inequality and keeping up 0.6 0.53 0.38 0.62
Saving Glut 0.32 0.28 0.02 0.03
Relaxed collateral constraint 0.02 0.02 0.0 0.0
Chapter 2
Top Incomes
and Mortgage Debt
Across the United States
Joint with Moritz Drechsel-Grau.
2.1 Introduction
Income inequality and household debt have risen in parallel between 1980
and 2007. In theory, there are at least two causal mechanisms that generate
this relationship. We refer to them as the savings channel and the compar-
isons channel. This chapter uses distributional national accounts (DINA)
data compiled by Piketty, Saez, and Zucman (2018b) to provide some new
empirical findings on the relationship between household debt and income
inequality. These findings are consistent only with the comparisons channel.
The comparisons channel was proposed in Chapter 1.1 Debt growth is
driven by the appetite for housing of the non-rich. Non-rich households
upgrade their houses to keep up with the houses of the ever richer rich. Debt
rises because these houses are usually mortgage-financed.
The savings channel was proposed by Kumhof et al. (2015). Debt growth
is driven by the appetite for savings of the rich. Asset market clearing dictates
that the non-rich have to take out debt to match the savings of the rich. This
hypothesis is echoed by Mian, Straub, and Sufi (2020) who show that most
of the debt of non-rich is held by the rich.
1In Chapter 1 we formalize ideas put forward by Stiglitz (2009), Rajan (2011) and Frank
(2013b) and builds on complementary empirical evidence by Bellet (2019), De Giorgi,
Frederiksen, and Pistaferri (2020) and Bertrand and Morse (2016).
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We construct a state-year-income group panel for the period from 1980 to
2007 from US DINA data. These data cover the joint distribution of income,
wealth and outstanding debt by year and US state. The data set allows us to
track outstanding debt by debt category, income group and state over time.
We provide evidence from three different methods. First, we compare
the long-run changes of top incomes and household debt between 1980 and
2007. Second, we run panel regressions using state and year fixed effects.
And third, we study the dynamic response of debt to changes in top incomes
using local projections.
We document three new empirical findings. First, there is a positive
relationship between incomes of the rich and mortgage debt of the non-rich
at the US state level. Mortgage debt of the non-rich grows faster in states
that experience a stronger increase in top incomes. Second, we show that
the state-level relationship between top incomes and debt of the non-rich
is solely driven by mortgage debt. When top incomes rise, mortgage debt
increases, while non-mortgage debt does not react. Third, we find that rising
top incomes affect the level of outstanding mortgages. When top incomes
rise by 10%, the level of mortgages will persistently go up by 5%. It takes
some years for the new level to be reached.
Our findings show that the well-established savings channel cannot ac-
count for all aspects of the debt boom. The comparisons channel from Chap-
ter 1 is an important complementary explanation. It is necessary to explain
geographical variation and the differential effects across debt categories.
We do not expect the savings channel to generate our empirical findings
because it works through interest rates. First, if financial markets are suf-
ficiently integrated then local demand for savings need not be compensated
by local debt. Instead, abitrage should lead to a uniform increase in debt of
the non-rich across all states. Second, there is no reason to expect mortgage
debt to react differently than non-mortgage debt.
By contrast, the comparisons channel is consistent with the geographic
variation in responses and the fact that only mortgage debt reacts. As
noted in Chapter 1 top incomes drive debt because housholds substitute
durable status goods for non-durable non-status goods. This channel should
be strongest for housing and mortgage debt, because housing is the most
important visible good—both in terms of value and visibility.
We confirm that the relationship between mortgage debt and top in-
comes is not specific to the DINA data set. We build a county-year panel
of mortgage originations from the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA)
database. The data include information on the purpose of the mortgage
(new purchase, home improvement or refinancing) and the income of the
mortgage applicant. This allows us to construct distinct mortgage panels
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per loan purpose and per income group. We complement these data with
state-level income deciles from the Annual Social and Economic Supplement
(ASEC) of the Current Population Survey (CPS). Consistent with our find-
ings from the DINA data, there is a significant positive relationship between
county-level mortgage debt and state-level top incomes.
A note on causality In this chapter we do not exploit exogenous varia-
tion in income inequality. All estimates in this paper should be interpreted as
correlations rather than causal effects. That said, the correlations are consis-
tent with the causal theoretical mechanism based on social comparisons from
Chapter 1. Chapter 1, in turn, builds on a big empirical literature showing
that social comparisons causally shape economic desicion making.
Relation to the literature This chapter is most closely related to Coibion,
Gorodnichenko, Kudlyak, and Mondragon (2020), who find that, on average,
borrowing of the middle class goes up (while borrowing of the poor does
not increase) when inequality goes up. Mian et al. (2020) have shown that
most of the debt of non-rich is held by the rich, taking this as evidence for
the Saving Glut of the Rich hypothesis. Neither of these papers considers
differences between mortgages and non-mortgage debt.
We provide indirect evidence that individual economic decisions causally
depend on the consumption of others because of social preferences. This adds
to a growing literature on consumption externalities. Bellet (2019) has shown
that homeowners increase their spending on home improvements when a big
house is built in their neighborhood and Bertrand and Morse (2016) show
that consumption of the non-rich shift from non-conspicuous to conspicuous
goods when top incomes rise.
We borrow our empirical strategy from Bertrand and Morse (2016). We
analyze how the debt of the bottom 90% of the income distribution reacts
to income changes at the top of the income distribution. For our state-
level analysis we use the data set from Piketty et al. (2018b), who construct
distributional national accounts (DINA) for the United States.
Roadmap The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. In Sec-
tion 2.2, we describe the datasets that we use and how we aggregate them.
We present the empirical results in Section 2.3. Section 2.4 concludes.
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Figure 2.2.1: Outstanding debt by income group. Source: Authors’ calcula-
tions from the DINA database.
2.2 Data
We compile two different datasets. The main data set is aggregated from US
distributional national accounts (DINA) data (from Piketty et al., 2018b).
We compile a state-year-income-group panel for the period 1980–2007 cover-
ing income, outstanding mortgages and outstanding non-mortgage debt.
For our some additional analyses, we build a county-year-income-group
panel from two data sources. We combine individual-level mortgage origina-
tions data from the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA) database and
state-level inequality measures that we construct from the Current Popula-
tion Survey (CPS) Annual Social and Economic Supplement (CPS-ASEC).
2.2.1 US-DINA Data
The US-DINA data were constructed by Piketty et al. (2018b) to study the
evolution of economic inequality over time. They were constructed from tax,
survey, and national accounts data and cover the joint distribution of income
and wealth, including household debt, also across U.S. states. The DINA
data allow us split the data by state, debt category and income group.
The DINA data allow us to split outstanding debt by income group.
Figure 2.2.1 shows that the bottom 50% percent of income earners hold only
around 10% of outstanding mortgages, while the top 10% account for around
30% of all mortgages.
2.2.2 HMDA Mortgage Data
The HMDA was enacted by the Congress of the United States in 1975. It
requires most mortgage lenders to report individual mortgage applications
with the lender’s decision (originated or declined), loan amount, purpose
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Figure 2.2.2: Mortgage originations by purpose over time. Y-axis in log10-
scale. Source: Authors’ calculations from the HMDA database.
(purchase, home improvement or refinancing), borrower characteristics (gross
annual income, race, sex, census tract). Dell’Ariccia, Igan, and Laeven (2008)
report that the HMDA data base covers a substantial fraction of total mort-
gage originations: 78% for 2000 and between 88% and 96% for the years 2001
to 2006. The FED estimates coverage of more than 90% for 2016.2
Figure 2.2.2 shows some descriptive statistics from the HMDA database.
We see that the mean mortgage for purchase and refinancing was about
$100,000 in 1997 and grew quite montonously to about 250,000$ in 2016.
The total loan amount and the number of originated mortgages have seen
some cyclical behavior. Originations for purchases and home improvement
peaked around 2005, and fell until 2011 before starting to rise again. While
the number of originated loans did not change much between 1997 and 2016,
the aggregate loan amount tripled in all three categories (purchases and re-
financing were at about $300bn in 1997 and at almost $900bn in 2016).
We construct a county-year panel, aggregating the mortgage originations
by loan purpose (purchase, home improvement, refinancing) and income
group of the borrower. We use the state-level income distribution of a given
year as reference, and split the population into the bottom 50% (P0P50),
P50P70, P70P90 and the top 10% (P90P100).
Each of these four income groups accounts for a substantial share of
mortgage originations. As shown in Figure 2.2.3, the P90P100 and P70P90
groups each account for more than a quarter of all originated mortgages. The
bottom 50% account for about 15% of mortgage originations.
2Fed Bulletin November 2016: https://www.federalreserve.gov/publications/
2017-november-residential-mortgage-lending-in-2016.htm
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Figure 2.2.3: Mortgage originations by income group. Source: Authors’
calculations from the HMDA database.
2.2.3 Alternative Inequality Data
For our complementary analysis of county-level debt we calculate income and
income inequality measures on a state level from the CPS-ASEC. We use
household income and household weights.3
2.2.4 A Note on the Differences Between DINA and
HMDA Data
Other than being more granular, the HMDA data differ from to the DINA
data in that they contain mortgage originations, and not outstanding mort-
gages. In order to make the analysis as comparable as possible we use the
level of originations form HMDA as an equivalent to the change in outstand-
ing mortgages from DINA. (This neglects debt repayment.)
Moreover, while the income in DINA covers the income of the whole
population, HMDA only contains information on a person’s income if this
person has taken out a mortgage in a given year.
2.2.5 The Distribution of US Counties
US counties are quite unevenly distributed across states, and they have dis-
persion in terms of populations size. This is shown in Figure 2.2.4. The
right panel shows that most counties have a population between 10,000 and
3We need to take an income measure (household income or individual income) that is
comparable to the HMDA data. The HMDA data contain the gross annual income relevant
for the lender. So this should be the sum of incomes of all applicants. Assuming (but
not having checked) that household usually apply for mortgages jointly, we use household
income. Incidentally, Bertrand and Morse (2016), who compare consumption from the
Consumer Expenditure Survey (CEX) to income groups, also need household income.
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Figure 2.2.4: The distribution of county population (as of 2000) and the
distribution of counties across states.
100,000. Most states have less than but close to 100 counties. This is why
we use population weights for our county-level analysis.
2.3 Empirical Analysis
On an aggregate level, mortgage debt and top income inequality have risen
in lockstep between 1980 and 2007 in the United States (see, Chapter 1). In
this section we use geographical variation across US states and counties to
show that mortgage debt has grown faster in regions that have experienced
stronger growth in income inequality over this time period.
We use average top incomes of the top 10% as our measure of income
inequality. This has two reasons. First, Piketty et al. (2018b) have shown
that average incomes of the bottom 50% have stagnated between 1980 and
2007 while incomes of the top 10% have doubled in the US. So, top incomes
capture an important dimension of the change in income inequality over this
time period. And second, we have shown in Chapter 1 that this exact nature
of rising inequality drives debt under the comparisons channel. Rising top
incomes drives the debt of the bottom 90%.
We will use the following notation. Let incomesgs,t be the average income
and debtgst be the average debt for the income group g in state s and year t.
We consider the income groups
g ∈ {bottom 90%, bottom 50%,middle 40%}.
Let further top incomess,t be the average incomes of the top 10% in a given
state s and year t. Unless noted otherwise all data come from the DINA data
set.
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2.3.1 Debt and Inequality Over the Long-run (1980–2007)
First, we look at simple long-run correlations between income inequality and
debt. We show that there is a positive relationship between top incomes and
household debt. This relationship is driven by mortgages only.
For a state s and income group g we look at the following relationship,
∆ log(debtgs) = α + β∆ log(top incomess) + ε
g
s, (2.1)
where we look at changes between 1980 and 2007. We provide additional
results using the change in income of group g as a control variable. (This
is not possible for the top 10%, for whom own income and top incomes are
identical.) Figure 2.3.1a shows that there is a positive relationship between
household debt growth and growth in top incomes. This positive relationship
is present in household debt across the income distribution.
Figure 2.3.1b reveals that this relationship between debt and inequality
is only driven by mortgages. We split total household debt in mortgage
debt and non-mortgage debt. While the positive relationship between debt
and top incomes is preserved for mortgages, non-mortgage debt growth even
seems to be slightly negatively related to changes in top incomes.
Table 2.3.1 shows that, absent any control variables, top incomes are a
statistically significant predictor for mortgage debt across all income groups,
while being insignificant in predicting growth of other debt. When adding
income growth of own incomes as a first control variable, the picture doesn’t
change much. Top incomes stay significant for bottom 50% mortgages, be-
coming just insignifcant for middle 40% mortages. The coefficients for non-
mortgage debt turn negative.
2.3.2 Fixed Effect Regressions
The regression model (2.1) uses only the information of the years 1980 and
2007. We now estimate a fixed effect regression using the full state-year-
income group panel. We estimate a set of regression models of the form
log(debtgst) = α+β log(top incomesst)+γ log(incomes
g
st)+δs+δt+εst (2.2)
for the two different debt categories (mortgage debt, non-mortgage debt).
If β is positive, higher top income levels are associated with higher current
levels of non-rich debt when non-rich incomes are held constant and state
and year effects (δs, δt) are controlled for.
Table 2.3.2 shows that this coefficients is indeed positive. A 10% in-
crease in top incomes is associated with a 3% increase in total debt of the
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Figure 2.3.1: Change in top 10% incomes and household debt between 1980
and 2007 across US states
(a) Total household debt by income group
1.25 1.50 1.75 2.00
1.5
1.8
2.1
2.4
2.7
 
1.25 1.50 1.75 2.00
 (A) debt of bottom 50% (B) debt of middle 40%
Δlog(top incomes)
Δl
og
(d
eb
t)
(b) Mortgage and non-mortgage debt by income group
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Table 2.3.1: Growth of debt by income group and growth of top 10% incomes
between 1980 and 2007 for US states
mortgages
bottom 50% middle 40% top 10%
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
(Intercept) 1.327*** 0.402 0.715** -0.101 0.958***
(0.290) (0.430) (0.272) (0.315) (0.202)
top incomes 0.622*** 0.450** 0.784*** 0.260 0.615***
(0.175) (0.176) (0.165) (0.196) (0.122)
own income 0.951*** 1.488***
(0.342) (0.376)
Estimator OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
N 51 51 51 51 51
R2 0.204 0.314 0.316 0.485 0.342
non-mortgage debt
bottom 50% middle 40% top 10%
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
(Intercept) 1.797*** 1.156*** 1.759*** 1.434*** 1.259***
(0.171) (0.245) (0.174) (0.221) (0.154)
top incomes 0.082 -0.037 -0.104 -0.312** -0.017
(0.103) (0.100) (0.105) (0.137) (0.093)
own income 0.659*** 0.592**
(0.195) (0.263)
Estimator OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
N 51 51 51 51 51
R2 0.013 0.202 0.019 0.113 0.001
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Authors’ calculations based on data from DINA
(Piketty et al., 2018b).
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bottom 90%. Hence there is both economically and statistically significant
co-variation of local top incomes and non-rich debt. Like in the previous
specification this relationship is entirely driven by mortgage debt. While
mortgage debt is affected by top incomes, non-mortgage debt is not.
Figure 2.3.2 visualizes the estimation results by showing residualized
binned scatter plots of non-rich debt and top incomes. The slope of the
fit is equal to β in equation (2.2). The regression model is able to capture
a substantial amount of the relationship of non-rich debt and top incomes
after accounting for fixed effects and non-rich income.
2.3.3 Impulse Responses from Local Projections
We now analyze the dynamic response of non-rich debt to changes in top
incomes. In particular, we estimate the impulse response function of non-
rich debt using local projections of the form
∆h+1 log(debts,t+h) = α
h + βh∆ log(top incomesst) + δ
h
t +
3∑
k=1
(
γhk log(debt
g
s,t−k) + φ
h
k log(top incomess,t−k)
)
+ εhst (2.3)
for each h ∈ {0, . . . , 10}, where
∆h+1 log(debts,t+h) = log(debt
g
s,t+h)− log(debtgs,t−1).
The coefficients βh give us the cumulative %-change in non-rich debt that is
induced by a one-time change in top-incomes by 1%. Figure 2.3.3 plots the
estimated impulse response function for mortgage and non-mortgage debt
for the middle 40% and bottom 50% of the income distribution. By adding
past debt and inequality measures as controls, specification (2.3) essentially
compares states with the some pretrends in debt and inequality, but where
one state experiences a stronger increase in inequality in t.
Consistent with the previous specifications, top incomes drive up mort-
gage debt substantially over the following ten years while non-mortgage debt
remains roughly constant. The elasticity of mortgage debt with respect to
top incomes is somewhat higher for the middle 40% than for the bottom
50% and more precisely estimated.4 For the middle 40%, a 10% increase in
top incomes from t − 1 to t translates into persistent increase in mortgage
debt of roughly 5% after five to ten years. The same change in top incomes
is associated with a 2% increase in mortgage debt of the bottom 50%. For
non-mortgage debt, there are no (persistent) effects in both income groups.
4Controlling for lags of non-rich income does not change the estimated IRFs.
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Figure 2.3.2: Relationship Between Non-Rich Debt and Top IncomesFigure 7: Relationship B een Non-Rich Debt and Top Inc mes
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Note: This figure shows the relationship between debt (total, mortgage, other) of non-rich households (bottom 90, middle
40, bottom 50 % of income distribution) conditional on state and year fixed e↵ects. The All variables are demeaned. The
slope of the regression line is equal to the conditional elasticity. Each dot represents the mean log top income and mean
log non-rich-debt within 20 equal-sized bins of the x-variable (log top income).
10
Note: This figure shows the relationship between debt (to al, mortgage, oth r) of
non-rich households (bottom 90, middle 40, bottom 50 % of income distribution)
conditional on state and year fixed effects. The All variables are demeaned. The slope of
the regression line is equal to the conditional elasticity. Each dot represents the mean log
top income and mean log non-rich-debt within 20 equal-sized bins of the x-variable (log
top income).
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Figure 2.3.3: Response of Non-Rich Debt to Increase in Top Incomes
2.3 Impulse Responses from Local Projections
We now analyze the dynamic response of non-rich debt to changes in top incomes. In par-
ticular, we estimate the impulse response function of non-rich debt using local projections
of the form
log(XNRs,t+h)  log(XNRs,t 1) =↵h +  h  log(Y Rst ) +
3X
k=1
⇣
 hk log(X
NR
s,t k) +  
h
k log(Y
R
s,t k)
⌘
+  ht + u
h
st (2)
for each h = 0, . . . , 10. The coe cients  h give us the cumulative %-change in non-rich
debt that is induced by a one-time change in top-incomes by 1%. Figure 8 plots the
estimated impulse response function for mortgage and non-mortgage debt for the middle
40 and bottom 50 percent of the income distribution.
Consistent with the fixed e↵ect regression, top incomes drive up mortgage debt sub-
stantially over the following ten years while non-mortgage debt remains roughly constant.
The elasticity of mortgage debt with respect to top incomes is somewhat higher for the
middle 40 than for the bottom 50 and more precisely estimated.1 For the middle 40, a
10% increase in top incomes from t 1 to t translates into persistent increase in mortgage
debt of roughly 5% after five to ten years. The same change in top incomes is associated
with a 2% increase in mortgage debt of the bottom 50. For non-mortgage debt, there are
no (persistent) e↵ects in both income groups.
Figure 8: Response of n-Rich Debt to Increase in Top Incomes
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Note: This figure shows the cumulative e↵ect of a 1% change in top-10 incomes on mortgage and
non-mortgage debt of the middle 40 and bottom 50. The confidence bands are constructed using a
significance level of 10%.
1Controlling for lags of non-rich income does not change the estimated IRFs.
11
Note: This figure shows th cumulative effect of a 1% change in top-10 income on
mortgage and non-mortgage debt of the middle 40 and bottom 50. The confidence bands
are constructed using a significance level of 10%.
2.3.4 County-level Analysis
In the previous subsections we have shown that there is a clear positive
relationship between mortgages and inequality in the DINA data. In this
subsection we show that one can find the same relationship using independent
data. We compile a county-year-income group panel of mortgage originations
from the HMDA database and combine it with annual state-level income
inequality measures from the CPS-ASEC. Since coverage of the HMDA data
was much worse in the early 1990s we analyze changes between 1997 and
2007.
These datasets force us to use alternative measures of debt and inequal-
ity. Since the HMDA database tracks mortgage originations (as opposed to
outstanding mortgages), we use the sum of originations over the time period
as a dependent variable. This is a close as we we can get to the actual change
in outstanding debt over this time horizon.
∆debtr,g,p :=
2007∑
t=1996
originationsr,t,g,p.
We normalize this variable by average income of the full time period. Let
Ic,g,t,p = {1, . . . , Nc,g,t,p} be the set of all observed mortgage originations for
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Figure 2.3.4: County-level mortgage-originations and change in state-level
income inequality between 1997 and 2007. The regression line is computed
with population weights. Source: Authors calculations based on HMDA and
CPS-ASEC data.
income group g in county c during year t with purpose p. Then
yc,g,p :=
1∑
tNc,g,t,p
∑
t
∑
i∈Ic,g,t,p
incomei.
As for the inequality measure, we follow Bertrand and Morse (2016) and
use percentiles instead of group averages. We use the P90/P50 ratio as a
measure for income inequality.
We run regression of the following kind,
∆debtc,g,p
yc,g,p
= α + β∆ log(inequalitys(c)) + εc,g,p,
where c is the county, s(c) the corresponding state, g the income group and p
is the purpose of the mortgage (purchase, refinancing or home improvement).
Regressions are run separately for each income group g and mortgage purpose
p. Since U.S. counties are quite hetergeneous in terms of their size we use
weighted statistics whenever appropriate.
Figure 2.3.4 shows the relationship between the change in income inequal-
ity (measured by the change of log of the P90/P50 ratio) on the state level
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and new originations on the county level. The figure shows that there is a
positive correlation between debt growth and income inequality for all in-
come groups and mortgage purpose categories. Table 2.3.3 shows that this
correlation is statistically significant across all income groups for purchases,
and for some income groups for the other two debt purpose categories.
This findings are consistent with the previous sections. Regions that
experience stronger increases in income inequality also experience stronger
growth in mortgage debt.
2.4 Conclusion
This chapter provides further evidence that household debt and income in-
equality are fundamentally linked. We showed that US states that expe-
rienced a stronger growth in top incomes, also have a stronger growth in
mortgage debt. This finding is confirmed by the results of a fixed effects re-
gression, local projections and complementary analysis using different data.
We find that the effect on mortgage balances builds up over time and it
seems that higher inequality affects the level of mortgages in the long-run.
Importantly, this relationship between debt of the non-rich and top incomes
only holds for mortgages. Non-mortgage debt does not seem to be affected
by rising top incomes.
These findings shed some light on potential causal mechanisms that link
mortgage balances and top income inequality. Among the two theoretical
mechanisms that have been proposed in the literature, only one mechanism
is consistent with two of these facts. The comparisons channel (proposed in
Chapter 1) is consistent with a state-level variation in mortgage growth and
with the fact that non-mortgage debt is unaffected. By contrast, the savings
channel (proposed by Kumhof et al., 2015) is consistent with neither of these
facts if financial markets are sufficiently integrated. Local demand for savings
need neither be compensated by local debt, nor by mortgages alone. Instead,
abitrage should lead to a uniform increase in debt of the non-rich across all
states and across both debt categories. The savings channel alone cannot
account for all of the variation in debt growth during the debt boom. The
comparisons channel should be regarded as an important complementary
explanation.
We show that the relationship between debt and top incomes is also
present in a different dataset based on HMDA data. The analysis of these
county-level data has some issues that need to be dealt with in future work.
First, we only observe mortgage originations, but not the outstanding bal-
ances of mortgage debt. Second, and more importantly, we do not observe
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the full income distribution at the county-level. All we have is the income
data for new borrowers. Better income data is important to correctly control
for income growth of the non-rich, and also to get within-state variation of
top income growth.
Chapter 3
Understanding
Housing Wealth Effects:
Debt, Home-Ownership
and the Lifecycle
Joint with Frederick Zadow.
3.1 Introduction
During the Great Recession, the US saw a pronounced drop in house prices
along with a stark reduction in consumption expenditures. The large reduc-
tion in spending has been attributed to housing wealth effects: Households
reduced their non-durable consumption as a reaction to the depreciation of
their housing wealth. Mian, Rao, and Sufi (2013) emphasize the role of debt
for housing wealth effects. They find that aggregate housing wealth effects
are stronger in more indebted regions.1 This finding suggests that imposing
low enough debt limits is a potent policy to dampen consumption response
to a house price bust. In response, as of 2018, 60% of advanced countries
have introduced maximum loan-to-value ratios.2
In this paper we show that this conclusion might be premature. A one-
size-fits-all approach to regulating debt limits might not be the best measure
1Aladangady (2017) provide further empirical evidence on the relationship between
debt and housing wealth effects. Macroeconomic models of housing generate a similar
correlation (e.g. Berger et al., 2018).
2For more details see Cerutti, Claessens, and Laeven (2017) and https://voxeu.org/
article/increasing-faith-macroprudential-policies.
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to increase resilience to a house price bust. Instead, measures should be
taylored to household characteristics and take into account the aggregate
taste for housing.
To this end, we build a simple life-cycle permanent-income model that
allows closed form solutions for housing wealth effects. Housing wealth effects
do not directly depend on debt. They do depend on household characteristics
(age and the utility weight for housing) which also determine the level of
indebtedness. Thus, there is a reduced form correlation between aggregate
debt and the aggregate consumption reaction on a regional level. The sign
of this correlation depends on the composition of agents.
Consider a baseline region A with a continuum of agents and compare
it to three other regions. Region B has identical distributions of age and
incomes, but agents have a larger utility weight of housing. Region B will be
more indebted than region A and will have stronger housing wealth effects.
Region C has identical distributions of incomes and housing preferences,
but agents are younger than in region A. Region C will be more indebted
than region A and will have weaker housing wealth effects.
Region D has identical distributions of age and housing preferences, but
agents have more front-loaded incomes than in region A. Region D will be
more indebted than region A and will have as strong housing wealth effects
as region A.
Thus, the underlying reason for being indebted changes the sign of the
effect on housing wealth effects. This finding is not inconsistent with Mian
et al. (2013), who find that more indebted regions had a stronger consumption
response in the crisis. If the age distribution is similar across regions, their
estimate is simply picking up the effect of differences in the taste for housing.
We test the predictions of our model empirically. We use data on con-
sumption and housing from the CEX and MSA-level house price indices from
Zillow.com. We construct a proxy for housing preferences from the residual
of an auxiliary regression and show that mortgages are a statistically signif-
icant predictor of the size of housing wealth effects only if age and housing
prefences are excluded from the regression. If, on the other hand, mortgages
are excluded, age and housing preferences both have the predicted statisti-
cally significant positive effect on housing wealth effects.
From these findings we derive two main policy implications. First, debt
limits should vary with age. For young households home ownership provides
an opportunity to build up wealth. At the same time, this group does not
exhibit strong housing wealth effects. Hence, it does not appear reasonable
to further constrain their choices with respect LTV limits. Instead, the abil-
ity of older households to take out debt should be curtailed more strongly.
It is these people that display stronger consumption reactions and thereby
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Figure 3.1.1: Real and nominal house prices in the USA.
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Notes: Nominal: Case-Shiller Home Price Index. Real: Deflated by the Consumer Price
Index. Source: http://www.econ.yale.edu/~shiller/data.htm
impose more of the negative externalities of housing wealth effects on the
economy. The reason is that housing makes up a larger share of older house-
holds’ remaining lifetime wealth, therefore they react stronger to price busts.
Hence, from the policy maker’s perspective it makes sense to encourage di-
versification of senior people’s portfolios into other assets such as stocks and
downsizing of houses. The importance of this conclusion will only increase
during the coming years when the baby boomer generation, which holds a
larger share of national wealth (in housing) is about to enter retirement. Ac-
cording to our model, a given housing bust in the future will lead to a more
severe reduction in consumption expenditures compared to today due to the
changing demographics.
Second, politicians should reconsider policies which promote home own-
ership. In the US such policies often convey the message that owning a big
house is still part of the American Dream. Through the lense of our model,
a high home ownership rate can be considered as an expression of strong
household preferences for housing. However, stronger preferences for hous-
ing are associated with bigger housing wealth effects. Hence, policies that
raise home ownership contribute to financial instability.
Contributions to the literature This paper connects to the empirical
and the quantitative macroeconomic literatures on housing wealth effects.
We provide a tractable model that rationalizes both empirical and quantita-
tive findings about the heterogeneity of housing wealth effects.
Empirical studies have shown that the reaction of consumption to changes
in housing wealth varies with household characteristics. Mian et al. (2013)
show that counties that are more leveraged and poorer react more strongly to
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Figure 3.1.2: Homeownership in the US and policy goals.
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house price changes. Campbell and Cocco (2007) find heterogeneous housing
wealth effects with respect to housing status and age. They find strongest
reactions for older homeowners and the weakest reaction for young renters.
Aladangady (2017) shows that the response to house prices is neglibile for
renters and large for homeowners. His specifications implies that the con-
sumption response is proportional to initial house values.
Our model generates the findings that homeowners that are older or have
bigger houses react stronger while renters don’t react. We show that the
role of indebtedness is ambiguous on an individual level, but likely negative
(consistent with previous findings) on an aggregate level.
Similar to the empirical studies mentioned above, quantitative macroeco-
nomic studies have found that housing wealth effects vary across individuals.
Guren et al. (2020) show that the consumption response, as a function of
loan-to-value (LTV), is hump shaped. Berger et al. (2018) show numerically
that consumption elasticities vary with income, age, housing, liquid assets
and renting decision. With the exception of liquid assets, we can investigate
all of these dimensions analytically in our model.
Moreover, Berger et al. (2018) derive a rule-of-thumb for housing wealth
effects, which are given by the initial value of the house times the marginal
propensity to consume. We complement their finding by providing a for-
mula that is solely based on primitives of the model, without relying on an
endogenous object like the MPC.
Structure of the paper The paper is organized as follows. In Section 3.2
we present our tractable life-cyle model with housing and mortgages and
its solution. Subsequently, we derive closed forms for housing wealth ef-
fects in our model (this is our main result) and discuss comparative statics
in Section 3.3. In Section 3.4 we provide an empirical test of our model’s
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predictions.
3.2 A Simple Lifecycle Model with Housing
Time is discrete and runs forever. Households are born with an initial en-
dowment of assets a0 ≥ 0 and live for J ∈ N periods. There are two types of
households: homeowners and renters. These two types differ in their access
to technology: homeowners are not allowed to rent, renters are not allowed to
buy.3 Households derive utility from a non-durable consumption good c and
their durable housing stock h (rented or owned). They supply labor inelas-
tically and receive earnings y. Households choose streams of consumption
ct > 0, housing stock ht > 0 and assets at ∈ R to maximize their discounted
lifetime utility.
3.2.1 Homeowners
Homeowners’ discounted lifetime utility is
J−1∑
t=0
βt
(
c1−ξt h
ξ
t
)1−γ
1− γ + β
J−1ψ(hJ−1),
where β > 0 is the discount factor and ψ : R+ → R represents a warm-glow
bequest motive. Households consume a Cobb-Douglas-aggregated composite
good from which they derive utility according to a standard constant relative
risk aversion (CRRA) utility function.
Housing is both a consumption good and an asset. It is modelled as a
homogeneous, divisible good. As such, h represents a one-dimensional mea-
sure of housing quality (including size, location and amenities). An agent’s
housing stock depreciates at rate δ and can be adjusted frictionlessly. Home
improvements and maintenance expenditures xt have the same price as hous-
ing (p) and go into the value of the housing stock one for one. The law of
motion for the housing stock is
ht = (1− δ)ht−1 + xt,
where h−1 = 0. The asset a serves both as a savings device and short-term
mortgage. Saving and borrowing can be done at the equilibrium interest rate
r. The law of motion for end-of-period assets is
at+1 = (1 + r)at + yt − ct − pxt,
3This assumption is a short-cut to explicitly modelling the renting-vs-owning decision
of households.
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where a0 is the given initial endowment. Agents are not allowed to die in
debt,
aJ+1 ≥ 0.
Otherwise, there are no borrowing constraints in our model. This is justified,
because there is no uncertainty, and thus, no reason to default in our model.
In order to obtain closed-form results for optimal choices, we make the
following assumptions. First, we assume that incomes are deterministic and
constant over time.
Assumption 5 (Constant incomes). yt = y for all t.
Second, we assume that the bequest function takes the following para-
metric form.
Assumption 6. The bequest function is ψ(h, p) = κ1
(κ2h)1−γ
1−γ where κ1 =
ξ β(1−δ)
1−β(1−δ) and κ2 =
(
(1− β(1− δ))1−ξ
ξ
p
)1−ξ
.
Assumption 6 will ensure that optimal choices for consumption c and
housing stock h are constant over time. It requires the marginal utility of
bequeathing a house being equal to the marginal utility of selling the house
during one’s lifetime.
Optimal choices
We first show that the optimal consumption and housing stock for a house-
hold is constant over time.
Lemma 5. Under Assumptions 5 and 6 the optimal choices for housing
stock and consumption are constant over time, ct = c and ht = h, for all
0 < t < J − 1 and in optimum c(h) = κ3ph, where κ3 = (1− β(1− δ))1−ξξ .
Proof. See Appendix 3.A.1.
Then we derive optimal choices for consumption c and housing h.
Proposition 4. Under Assumptions 5 and 6 optimal choices are
ph = Y 1
1− δ + θ(J, r) · (δ + κ3) ,
c = κ3ph,
where θ(J, r) :=
∑J−1
j=0
(
1
1+r
)j
and Y is life-time income.
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Proof. The life-time budget constraint is given by
(1− δ)ph+
J−1∑
j=0
( 1
1 + r
)j
(δph+ c) = a0 +
J−1∑
j=0
( 1
1 + r
)j
y =: Y
Using the definition of θ, and the assumption on c we get
Y = (1− δ)ph+ θ(J, r) · (δph+ κ3ph)
= ph
(
(1− δ) + θ(J, r) · (δ + κ3)
)
Rearranging yields the desired result.
Lemma 5 and Proposition 4 show that optimal choices are constant over
time and proportional to discounted lifetime income. An agent buys her op-
timal house in the first period, irrespective of how low the initial endowment
is. To cover the gap between initial resources and the downpayment, the
agent takes out a mortgage m0 and repays it over time. Let mt be the level
of outstanding mortgages at the beginning of period t and pit the debt service
in period t. The law of motion is given by
mt = (1 + r)(mt−1 − pit). (3.1)
Proposition 5. For homeowners, initial outstanding mortgages are
m0 = (θ − 1)
(
y
1 + θ κ3+δ
1−δ
− a0
θ + 1−δ
κ3+δ
)
, (3.2)
The debt service payment is constant overtime,
pit = pi = y − c− δph,
and the beginning-of-period outstanding mortgage at age j is
mt =
J−t−1∑
i=0
( 1
1 + r
)i
(y − c− δph). (3.3)
Proof. See Appendix 3.A.2.
From Proposition 5 it follows immediately that mortgages are positive,
as long as the income is sufficiently high or initial assets are sufficiently low.
Corollary 5. Initial mortgages are positive, m0 > 0, iff
y
a0
>
δ + κ3
(1− δ) .
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Figure 3.2.1: Optimal choices for consumption c, housing stock h and assets
a.
Proof. Follows immediately from the intermediate equation (3.10) in the
proof of Proposition 5.
If an agent inherits a sufficiently large initial endowment, she can finance
the downpayment of the house, without the need for a mortgage. If the
initial endowment exceeds the downpayment, the agent will be a saver. If,
on the other hand, an agent does not inherit any initial endowment, the
initial income will not be sufficient to cover the downpayment. She will need
to take shift part of her lifetime income to the present using a mortgage.
Moreover, we can see the determinants of indebtedness.
Corollary 6. For homeowners, initial debt is increasing in the taste for
housing ξ and flow income y and decreasing in initial endowments a0. Out-
standing debt is decreasing with age.
Proof. Follows immediately from (3.2) and (3.3) in Proposition 5 because
κ3 ∝ 1/ξ − 1 and ∂κ3∂ξ < 0.
There are three reasons, why households are more indebted than others:
being young, having a stronger taste for housing, having low initial endow-
ments relative to lifetime income. Households that are younger are more
indebted, because they have had less time to repay their mortgage. House-
holds that have a stronger taste for housing are more indebted because they
need to finance a bigger house. Finally, for a given lifetime income, house-
holds with low initial endowments earn a larger share of their incomes later
in life. That is, they need to shift a larger amount of their lifetime income
to the present to finance the downpayment of the house.
3.2.2 Renters
Renters have no bequest motive. Their problem is then given by
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max
{ct,ht}J−1t=0
J−1∑
t=0
βtu(c1−ξt h
ξ
t )
s.t. ct + ρht + at+1 = (1 + r)at + yt
aJ ≥ 0
where ρ denotes the price of renting one unit of the housing good.
Under our given assumptions, agents’ consumption choice will not depend
on the rental price (which is a function of the house price).
Proposition 6. Optimal policies of renters are constant across time. Fur-
thermore, the level of consumption is independent of the cost of renting,
c∗ = (1− ξ)Y
θ
, ρh∗ = ξ
Y
θ
.
Proof. See Appendix 3.A.3.
In this framework renters’ optimal consumption is independent of the cost
of rent. Now suppose, that rent increases with rising house prices and vice
versa. A decrease in house prices then, which reduces consumption of home
owners, has no effect on renters. Their wealth is unaffected and therefore
also spending on consumption. This is in line with e.g. Berger et al. (2018);
Aladangady (2017) who find very small reactions of renters’ consumption
expenditure to changes in house prices.
3.3 Housing wealth effects with closed forms
We can now derive the main result of this paper: closed forms for the con-
sumption response to house price shocks. We have already shown that there
are no housing wealth effects for renters, so the remaining work to do is to
derive results for homeowners.
We assume that house price shocks are unexpected and permanent. In
our thought experiment, an agent wakes up at age j and observes that the
house price has fallen from p to q. She reconsiders her optimal choices given
her net worth,
a˜j = q(1− δ)h− (1 + r)mj−1,
her unchanged flow income y and her remaining lifetime J − j. Due to ex-
ponential discounting, her optimal choices are time consistent (Strotz, 1955)
and will be as if she was a (J − j)-period-lived agent with initial endowment
a˜j and flow income y given house price q.
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Figure 3.3.1: Housing wealth effects—the consumption response to a drop in
house prices—by age and housing preferences. Shock happens in t = 0.
Proposition 7. After an unexpected price change from p to q at the beginning
of a period, a homeowner of age j will adjust their consumption
c∗j
c∗0
=
(1− δ) q
p
+ θJ−j(δ + Ω)
(1− δ) + θJ−j(δ + Ω)
Proof. See Appendix 3.A.4.
Given this closed form result, it is easy to analyze the heterogeneity in
housing wealth effects along different household characteristics.
Proposition 8. The consumption response to an unexpected negative house
price shock is (i) zero for renters and (ii) negative for homeowners. Moreover,
the absolute response for homeowners is
1. increasing in age j and
2. increasing in the utility weight for housing ξ.
Proof. See Appendix 3.A.5.
Homeowners that are older or have stronger preferences for housing are hit
harder by house price shocks. This is illustrated in Figure 3.3.1. Agents have
to reduce their consumption to compensate their losses in housing wealth.
Intuitively, older agents react more strongly, because they have less time to
smooth out their losses. Agents with stronger preferences for housing own a
larger house, so they are facing larger losses that have to be compensated.
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Housing wealth effects and indebtedness
Proposition 8 is silent about the role of debt on housing wealth effects. This
is because indebtedness endogenous, rather than a primitive of the model.
Rather than looking at the role of debt directly, we can analyze how the
drivers of debt (see Corollary 6) affect the strength of housing wealth ef-
fects. Each driver—income profile, age and taste for housing—acts on hous-
ing wealth effects differently.
Income profile (y vs a0) Varying the ratio of initial endowment and flow
incomes will change the debt holdings for a given lifetime income Y . If more
of the lifetime income is earned through flow income, optimal debt will be
higher. For the choices of c and h however, the composition of lifetime income
is irrelevant in our complete markets setup. So, more indebted agents react
equally strongly.
Age j Households repay their debt over their lifetime. Older agents are
less indebted than poor agents. As shown above, older agents have a stronger
consumption response. When comparing agents of different ages, more in-
debted agents react less strongly.
Taste for housing ξ We have shown that agents with stronger prefer-
ences for houses, are more indebted. They also react stronger to house price
changes. When comparing agents of different housing preferences, more in-
debted agents react more strongly.
From the perspective of our model, the effect of debt on individual housing
wealth effects is ambiguous. The reason for being indebted determines the
strength of the consumption response to a change in house prices.
3.3.1 Rationalizing the findings in the empirical liter-
ature
Campbell and Cocco (2007) use survey data from the UK to find heteroge-
neous housing wealth effects with respect to housing status and age. They
find the strongest reactions for older homeowners and the weakest reaction
for young renters. To do so they look at changes in house prices across
three regions (North, Center, South).4 Due to data limitations, Campbell
4This coarse distinction masks a lot of heterogeneity within these regions. For example,
the region ”North” contains all of Scotland with more densely populated, urban areas
around Edinburgh or Glasgow and very sparsely populated in the north of Scotland.
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and Cocco (2007) cannot condition their findings on individual house size.
Our model is consistent with their findings: older people react more strongly,
renters do not react.
Aladangady (2017) links the individual expenditure data from the CEX
with house price information on the MSA-level, using restricted-use geo-
graphical information from the CEX. He shows that the response to house
prices is neglibile for renters and large for homeowners. His specifications
implies that the consumption response is proportional to initial house val-
ues. Additionally, he finds that households with low LTV ratio react more
strongly than households with high LTV ratio. Our model is consistent with
the finding that effects are stronger for homeowners with bigger houses. On
the other hand, according to our model, his estimated effect of the LTV ratio
must pick up the underlying effect of the taste for housing.
Mian et al. (2013) use aggregate data (county and ZIP code level) on
expenditures and household balance sheets to show that there the elasticity
of consumption out of housing wealth is higher more leveraged and poorer
households. While we cannot (yet) make a statement about the reaction of
poorer households, we can rationalize the stronger effects of more indebted
regions. If the age distribution is similar across regions, their estimate is
simply picking up the effect of differences in the taste for housing. Regions
with a stronger taste for housing will react more strongly according to our
model.
3.3.2 Aggregate housing wealth effects
From Corollary 7 and Proposition 6 we know the housing wealth effects
for owners and renters. We showed that under Cobb-Douglas aggregation,
renters do not react at all.
Thus we can write the aggregate response as
Homeownership rate×mean response of owners.
Thus, bigger homeownership rate will lead to a stronger aggregate con-
sumption response to a house price change.
Hence, people may very well be assigned to a housing wealth effect when, in reality, they
do not experience one (e.g. when there is strong price appreciation in London, affecting
the whole region). We are able to avoid this problem by only considering narrowly defined
MSAs.
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3.4 Testing the predictions on housing wealth
effects
Now we take the model predictions to the data. We combine the CEX, a
quarterly panel with MSA-level geographic identifiers, with regional house
price data from Zillow.com. We construct a simple measure of housing pref-
erences from the residual of a regression explaining house sizes. We show
that, in line with our model, age and housing preferences are significant pre-
dictors of the size of housing wealth effects. When these two explanatory
variables are ommitted, their effect is picked up by the level of mortgage
debt.
3.4.1 Data
For the empirical exercise we employ data from two sources. First, we obtain
publicly available house price indices on the MSA level from Zillow.com, a
real estate listing site. In particular, we use the Zillow Home Value Index,
which is a “smoothed, seasonally adjusted measure of the median estimated
home value across a given region and housing type” according to the website.5
This data has been used in several other papers such as Graham (2018). The
data set covers the period from 1996 until 2017 on a monthly frequency,
which includes both the sharp decline following the financial crisis as well
the strong recovery in house prices that followed. This is an advantage over
many other papers in the literature that often only look at the sharp increase
in prices prior to the crisis.
Secondly, we use publicly available data from the Consumer Expenditure
Survey (CEX) from the Bureau of Labor Statistics. The CEX is a household
survey which includes detailed information on expenditures (such as durable
and non-durable goods). Additionally, the survey contains information on
the housing status of the household (i.e., if the household is a renter, home-
owner etc.), mortgage information and some other, more general household
characteristics. Households are observed at most four times within in 12
months (the time period does not have to correspond to a calendar year).
Between observations, there are always three months. This structure gives
the data set a panel dimension which allows us to identify the effect across
time.6
To match both data sets we use the fact that the publicly available CEX
5More information and the detailed methodology can be found under https://www.
zillow.com/research/data/
6For more details on the CEX data see https://www.bls.gov/cex/pumd.htm.
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data includes geographical information on the MSA level for a subset of all
households (23 MSAs). Hence, we allocate the house price level (measured
by the index) in a given month to every household which was residing in
that particular MSA. Our final data set consists of around 37.000 unique
households observed between 2006 and 2017.
3.4.2 Constructing a measure of housing preferences
The model predicts that the utility weight of housing ξ is an important
determinant of the magnitude of housing wealth effects. Since preferences
for housing are not directly observable, we need to construct a proxy from
the available data. We use information on rent equivalents, which is the
imputed market rent for a household’s house or apartment. The basic idea
behind this approach is that, given a household’s observable characteristics
(such as income and size), a higher implicit price one would pay for housing
suggests stronger preferences for housing (consistent with our model). To
operationalize this idea, we run a regression explaining the rent equivalents
using a set of household characteristics xi (such as location, education, age,
family size and income),
renti = α + βxi + ui.
Then we define the measure of housing preferences as the residual of the
regression (as a percentage deviation),
prefi =
renti − r̂enti
r̂enti
.
A household with a larger residual has a larger (or more expensive) home than
households with similar characteristics. We interpret that as the household
having larger than average utility weight of housing ξ.
3.4.3 Results
We run a regression of the form
∆ci,a,t
∆pa,t
= xi,a,tγ + εi,a,t,
where a is the index for the MSA, ∆ci,a,t is household-level change in non-
durable consumption and ∆pa,t in the change in the MSA-level house price
index and xi,a,t contains the a subset variables of interest (mortgages, age,
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Table 3.4.1: Regression output
∆c/∆p
(1) (2) (3)
own × log(mortgage) 0.727∗∗ 0.746◦◦
(0.362) (0.523)
own × h-pref-proxy 2.444∗∗ 1.722◦
(1.229) (1.371)
own × age 0.323∗ 0.247
(0.177) (0.269)
own × age2 -0.003∗ -0.002
(0.002) (0.003)
MSA FE Yes Yes Yes
year FE Yes Yes Yes
Estimator OLS OLS OLS
N 36,350 52,307 33,796
R2 0.002 0.001 0.002
∗∗∗p ≤ 0.01, ∗∗p ≤ 0.05, ∗p ≤ 0.1, ◦◦p ≤ 0.2, ◦p ≤ 0.3
the preference proxy, home ownership) and MSA and year fixed effects as
control variables.
We find that this simple test supports the predictions of our model. The
log of outstanding mortgages is a significant predictor of the size of housing
wealth effects—but only as long as the determinants of mortgages are ex-
cluded from the regression. Indeed, regression (2) in Table 3.4.1 shows that
the housing preference measure and age are statistically significant predictors
of housing wealth effects, when mortgages are excluded. When including all
three variables in regression (3) of Table 3.4.1, they all turn insignificant.
This result reflects the fact that there is a high correlation between these
variables.
3.5 Conclusion
Empirical and quantitative macroeconomic studies have found that housing
wealth effects are stronger for more indebted households. One important
policy implication is that lowering debt limits for borrowers will dampen the
consumption slump in a house price bust. In this chapter we show that such
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conclusions might be premature.
We build a simple life-cycle model with housing with closed form solutions
for housing wealth effects. We show that the strength of housing wealth
effects crucially depends on the underlying household characteristics which
also determine the debt levels. In this framework imposing one-size-fits-
all debt limits does not necessarily mitigate housing wealth effects. To be
effective, policies have to be tailored to borrowers’ characteristics. Aggregate
housing wealth effects can be reduced in three ways: (i) if old homeowners
reduce their housing wealth; (ii) if the home ownership rate decreases; (iii)
if agents have smaller houses. We provide a simple empirical test of our
model predictions. When explaining housing wealth effects, we find that the
level of mortgages turns statistically insignificant once relevant household
characteristics (age and a proxy for housing preferences) are added.
Appendix
3.A Proofs
3.A.1 Proof of Lemma 5
Proof. The Lagrangian is given by
J−1∑
t=0
βt
(
u(ct, ht)−λt
(
at+1−(1+r)at−yt+ct+p(ht−(1−δ)ht−1)
))
+βJ−1ψ(hJ−1)
where aJ = 0 is given. The first order conditions are as follows. For at,
t ≤ J − 1,
λt−1 = β(1 + r)λt =⇒ λ0 = · · · = λJ−1 = λ.
For ct for t ≤ J − 1,
uc(ct, ht) = λt = λ
For ht for t < J − 1,
uh(ct, ht) = λtp− (1− δ)pβλt+1 = λp(1− β(1− δ))
=⇒ uh
uc
= p(1− β(1− δ)) (3.4)
and for t = J − 1
uh(cJ−1, hJ−1) = λJ−1p− ψh(hJ−1). (3.5)
Using the CRRA-Cobb-Douglas functional form assumption we get
uc(c, h) = (1− ξ)(c
1−ξhξ)1−γ
c
(3.6)
uh(c, h) = ξ
(c1−ξhξ)1−γ
h
(3.7)
uh
uc
=
ξ
1− ξ
c
h
. (3.8)
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Combining (3.4) and (3.8) yields
ξ
1− ξ
c
h
= p(1− β(1− δ))
which gives an optimal relationship of c and h,
c∗(h) = (1− β(1− δ))1− ξ
ξ︸ ︷︷ ︸
κ3
ph = κ3ph. (3.9)
Using this relationship, (3.6) and (3.7) simplify to
uc(c
∗(h), h) = (1− ξ)((κ3ph)
1−ξhξ)1−γ
κ3ph
= (1− ξ)h−γ(κ3p)(1−ξ)(1−γ)−1
uh(c
∗(h), h) = ξ
((κ3ph)
1−ξhξ)1−γ
h
= ξh−γ(κ3p)(1−ξ)(1−γ).
We choose ψ to ensure that (3.9) also holds at age J − 1. So we plug the
previous expressions into (3.5),
uh − pλ = uh − puc = h−γ(κ3p)(1−ξ)(1−γ)
(
ξ − p1− ξ
κ3p
)
= ψ′(h).
Finally, define
κ˜1 := ξ − p1− ξ
κ3p
= ξ
β(1− δ)
1− β(1− δ) ,
κ˜2 := (κ3p)
1−ξ,
and use the guess for ψ from Assumption 6 to determine the undetermined
coefficients,
ψ′(h) = κ1κ
1−γ
2 h
−γ = h−γκ˜1−γ2 κ˜1.
=⇒ κ1 = κ˜1, κ2 = κ˜2.
3.A.2 Proof of Proposition 5
From Proposition 4 and the flow budget constraint XX we know that the
initial mortgage is
m0 = ph+ c− y − a0.
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Plugging in optimal choices we get
= (1 + κ3)
θy + a0
1− δ + (δ + κ3)θ − (y + a0)
=
(1 + κ3)(θy + a0)− (y + a0)(1− δ + (δ + κ3)θ)
1− δ + (δ + κ3)θ
= y
(1 + κ3)θ − (1− δ + (δ + κ3)θ)
1− δ + (δ + κ3)θ + a0
(1 + κ3)− (1− δ + (δ + κ3)θ)
1− δ + (δ + κ3)θ
= y
(θ − 1)(1− δ)
1− δ + (δ + κ3)θ − a0
(θ − 1)(κ3 + δ)
1− δ + (δ + κ3)θ
= (θ − 1)y(1− δ)− a0(κ3 + δ)
1− δ + (δ + κ3)θ (3.10)
= (θ − 1)
(
y
1 + θ κ3+δ
1−δ
− a0
θ + 1−δ
κ3+δ
)
,
which is the first claim of the proposition. The second claim follows from the
flow budget constraint and the fact that y, h and c are constant over time
(Proposition 4).
For the third claim, use the fact that mJ = 0, and solve the difference
equation (3.1) forward,
mt =
1
1 + r
mt+1 + pit
=
1
1 + r
( 1
1 + r
mt+2 + pit+1
)
+ pit
=
( 1
1 + r
)s
mt+s +
s∑
i=1
( 1
1 + r
)i−1
pit+s−1
let J = t+ s
=
( 1
1 + r
)J−t
mJ︸︷︷︸
0
+
J−t∑
i=1
( 1
1 + r
)i−1
pi
=
J−t∑
i=1
( 1
1 + r
)i−1
pit.
3.A.3 Proof of Proposition 6
As before the budget constraints can be combined into one lifetime budget
constraint. Let Y denote lifetime income. Let λ denote the Lagrange multi-
plier of the constraint maximization problem. The FOCs of the new problem
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are given by
(1− ξ)u′(c1−ξt hξt )
(ht
ct
)ξ
= λ
ξu′(c1−ξt h
ξ
t )
( ct
ht
)(1−ξ)
= λρ
From here it follows that policies are constant over time. Furthermore, rear-
ranging the FOCs and plugging them back into the lifetime budget constraint
yields the optimal policies:
c∗ = (1− ξ)Y
θ
ρh∗ = ξ
Y
θ
where θ is as defined before. The desired result follows.
3.A.4 Proof of Proposition 7
c∗(Y0, J) = c∗(Yj, J − j)
h∗(Y0, J) = h∗(Yj, J − j)
where
Y0 = a˜0 + θJy
Yj = a˜j + θJ−jy
and
a˜j = (1− δ)phj−1 −mj.
If, however, the environment changes, the agent will want to reallocate
their expenditures.
After the price change, agent’s optimal choices are given by
h∗j = Yj
1
q
(
(1− δ) + θJ−j(δ + Ω)) (3.11)
c∗j = qΩh
∗
j
where the new lifetime income at age j is given by a combination of current
wealth (h and m) and future income
Yj = a˜j + θJ−jy
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with
a˜j = (1− δ)qh−mj
= (1− δ)qh−mJ−(J−j)).
Plugging in our formulas for mJ−t (lemma XXX) and c (assumption XXX)
we get
a˜j = (1− δ)qh− θJ−jpi
= (1− δ)qh− θJ−j(y − c− δph)
=
(
(1− δ)q + pθJ−j(Ω + δ))h− θJ−jy.
Thus, agents lifetime income at age j is
Yj =
(
(1− δ)q + pθJ−j(Ω + δ))h∗0 (3.12)
Combining equations (3.11) and (3.12) we get new optimal house at age j,
h∗j =
p
q
(1− δ) q
p
+ θJ−j(δ + Ω)
(1− δ) + θJ−j(δ + Ω) h
∗
0
The new optimal consumption level at age j is given by
c∗j = qΩh
∗
j =
p
q
(1− δ) q
p
+ θJ−j(δ + Ω)
(1− δ) + θJ−j(δ + Ω)
q
p
pΩh∗0︸ ︷︷ ︸
c∗0
The optimal consumption response to an unexpected house price shock follow
directly from the previous equation.
3.A.5 Proof of Proposition 8
The consumption response has the following structure,
c∗j
c∗0
=
a+ f(x)
b+ f(x)
where a = (1−δ) q
p
, b = (1−δ) and f(J, j, δ,Ω) = θJ−j(δ+Ω). The derivative
is given by
∂
∂x
c∗j
c∗0
=
f ′(x)(b+ f(x))− f ′(x)(a+ f(x))(
b+ f(x)
)2
=
f ′(x)(b− a)(
b+ f(x)
)2
= f ′(x)
(1− δ)(p− q)
p
(
1− δ + f(x))2
∝ f ′(x)
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for a ngetive shock to prices. That is we can look at the partial derivative of
f only.
∂f
∂Ω
= θJ−j > 0
Higher Ω means a bigger weight on consumpion, that is agents hate houses
more. Thus,
0 < CR(ΩL) < CR(ΩH) < 1,
or
−100% < %CR(ΩL) < %CR(ΩH) < 0%.
That is, agents who love house more (lower Ψ), react stronger. For the
following result consider the extension of θ to the real numbers,
θ(t, r) =
1−
(
1
1+r
)t
1− 1
1+r
∂f
∂j
= (δ + Ω) θ′(J − j, r)︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
(−1) < 0
That is, agents with higher age react stronger (Using the same reasoning as
above).
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